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This doctoral thesis focuses on two different topics: the impact of economic 
expectations on bank performance and corporate culture. 
The first topic, the link between economic expectations and the performance 
of banks, has received little attention in the existing literature. This is surprising 
because Coval and Thakor (2005) show that the increased relevance of the banking 
systems in developed economies can be explained by heterogeneous beliefs among 
economic agents. Specifically, their model includes three types of agents: optimistic, 
pessimistic, and rational agents. Optimistic agents overestimate the success 
probability of any project; pessimistic agents generally underestimate it; and rational 
agents can correctly assess the probability of economic success. Coval and Thakor 
(2005) show that in an economy characterized by the above beliefs system, rational 
agents will become financial intermediaries, pessimistic agents will become investors, 
and optimistic agents will become entrepreneurs. The intuition behind this result is 
that rational agents can profitably finance optimistic entrepreneurs who cannot be 
funded by pessimistic investors. The model predicts that investors have generally 
different expectations than bankers about future economic outcomes and that banks 
will report better performance in periods of high economic optimism.  
Chapter 1 of this thesis examines how bankers’ expectations about future 
merger gains are reflected in the performance of the merged banks in the long run and 
in the investors’ reaction to a deal’s announcement. Specifically, I analyze whether 
expected cost-saving synergies are reflected in more positive investors’ reactions and 
in higher long-run performance of the merged banks. The main finding of this paper is 
that investors are generally skeptical about bankers’ projections. I show that the 
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expected cost-saving synergies do not always increase investors’ reactions to the deal 
announcement but are generally reflected in higher long-run performance of the 
merged banks. This paper is coauthored with Franco Fiordelisi and has been accepted 
for presentation in Cass Business School during the 4
th
 edition of the “Emerging 
Scholars in Banking and Finance Conference.” 
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of high expectations for future economic 
success (i.e., high optimism) on the profitability of banks. Specifically, this chapter 
analyzes the performance of the US banking systems in periods of high optimism. 
The main finding of this paper is that banks operating in more competitive 
environments report better performance in periods of high economic optimism. I 
show that in periods of high optimism, credit losses in banks’ lending portfolios 
increase only in protected banking systems. I interpret these findings to mean that 
banks operating in competitive environments are able to measure credit risk more 
precisely and perform better in periods of high optimism.  
The existing literature has shown that high expectations for future economic 
success are an important determinant of firms’ propensity to undertake innovative 
projects (Galasso et al. 2011 and Hirshleifer et al. 2012). In the last chapter of this 
thesis, I shift my focus to the firms’ innovation activity and its relation to corporate 
culture.  
Chapter 3 analyzes whether a creativity-oriented corporate culture is positively 
associated with firms’ innovation activity. I use the Competitive Value Framework to 
identify four different corporate cultures: creative, competitive, control-oriented, and 
collaborative. I use text analysis to estimate a score for each corporate culture. The 
main finding of this paper is that a creative corporate culture is positively associated 
with investment in R&D, with firms patenting activity, and with firm value. To 
10 
alleviate endogeneity problems, I also instrument corporate culture with tax credit on 
R&D in the United States. The results from the instrumental variable approach 
confirm the positive association between a creative corporate culture and the firm’s 
innovation activity. This paper is coauthored with Luc Renneboog, Franco Fiordelisi, 
and Ornella Ricci. 
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Errare Humanum Est, Perseverare Autem Diabolicum: A 
Test of Investors learning from information spillover  
 
 
Abstract: Prior research indicates that cost saving synergies disclosed by the buyer at 
a merger deal’s announcement are not fully capitalized in the market prices of the 
banks involved in the merger (Houston et al., 2001). This is surprising because these 
synergies are generally achieved within three years of the merger announcement. We 
posit that investors discount buyer expectations of cost saving synergies because at 
the announcement date, they do not have enough information to correctly evaluate the 
long-run effect of the reorganization plan. Because some information relevant for 
pricing the merger could spill over from concluded deals (DeLong and De Young, 
2007), we test whether the number of mergers concluded in the recent past moderates 
the link between investor reactions and expected cost saving synergies communicated 
at the announcement date. Our results indicate that the link between investor reactions 
and expected cost savings becomes gradually positive as merger activity becomes 
more intense. We also find that the expected cost saving synergies are positively 
related to the long-run performance of the merging banks. Therefore, in periods of 
intense merger activity, the link between investor reactions and expected cost savings 
is more consistent with the cost savings realized in the long-run performance of the 
merged banks. Our results overall suggest that investors use the information spilling 
over from concluded deals to price the merger announcement, and in periods of 
intense merger activity, their reactions become more consistent with the long-run 





In recent decades, the US banking industry has experienced intense merger activity. 
The number of banks has substantially declined, increasing industry concentration. 
The 10 largest banks in the United States went from controlling 13.5% of the industry 
assets in 1980 to controlling roughly half of the market by the end of 2010 (Adams, 
2012). This consolidation followed in the wake of important regulatory reforms and 
technological advances that completely changed banking activity (De Young et al., 
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2009). Merging banks must reorganize, and how such reorganizations occur can have 
far-reaching effects on the long-run performance of merging banks.  
Although some information about the reorganization plan of the banks involved in 
a merger is usually communicated, little is known about how investors react to this 
information. Only Houston et al. (2001) empirically examine the relation between 
bank reorganizations and value creation. They find that reorganization is an important 
source of value creation, because investors react positively to deals that are expected 
to generate cost-saving synergies in the long run. However, they also show that cost-
saving expectations are not entirely capitalized in the market price of merging banks 
upon the merger announcement. This evidence is surprising because the authors show 
that the expected cost saving synergies are completely met by three years from the 
merger announcement. Moreover, analyzing press releases and financial reports, 
Houston et al. (2001) show that financial analysts are generally sceptical about the 
management projections of future synergies.  
 In a more recent study, De Long and De Young (2007) show that in periods of 
intense merger activity, investor reaction to deal announcements becomes more 
consistent with the long-run performance of the merged banks because information 
relevant for pricing the merger spills over from concluded deals. Specifically, the 
authors show that the number of deals concluded in the recent past substantially 
strengthens the positive link between investor reaction and the long-run performance 
of merged banks.  These results indicate that in period of intense merger activity, 
investors are better able to identify deals that enhance the long-run performance of 
merged banks. Because cost-savings should positively affect the long-run 
performance of merged banks, the number of deals communicated in the recent past 
may also decrease investor scepticism. This may moderate the link between investor 
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reactions and the cost savings the bidder expects to achieve through reorganization of 
the target. This evidence leads us to the following research question: Does the number 
of deals concluded in the recent past moderate the link between investor reactions and 
expected cost saving synergies?  
To address this question, we use a sample of 167 mergers announced by US banks 
between 1999 and pre-crisis 2007. We collect information on the expected cost 
savings communicated at the deal announcement. These estimated synergies are the 
amount of cost savings the bidder expects to realize through expense reductions at the 
target.  
We show that the link between investor reactions and the expected cost saving 
synergies becomes positive when merger activity becomes more intense. Although the 
two are not positively associated in periods of low merger activity, when the number 
of deals concluded in the recent past increases, the link between investor reactions 
and expected costs savings becomes positive. This finding suggests that an increase in 
the number of mergers announced in the recent past leads investors to adjust upward 
their expectations on the effect that the cost savings communicated at the 
announcement date will have on the long-run performance of the merged banks. Thus, 
some relevant information about the link between expected cost savings and long-run 
performance might spill over from concluded deals. An alternative explanation could 
be that investors’ expectations about future merger gains become overly optimistic in 
periods of intense merger activity (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-
Kropf et al., 2005).  
These two explanations lead to opposing predictions about the effect that expected 
cost savings would have on the long-run performance of merging banks. The 
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increased investor knowledge explanation predicts that expected cost savings would 
have a positive effect on the long-run performance of merging banks. Conversely, if 
investors are overly optimistic in periods of intense merger activity, we would expect 
to see a negative or at least non-positive link between buyer expectations and long-run 
performance. To disentangle these two alternative explanations, we analyze the effect 
of expected cost saving synergies on the long-run performance of merged banks.  
We find that higher expected cost saving synergies are positively associated with 
the long-run performance of the merged banks, including increased long-run 
profitability, enhanced interest margins, and improved cost efficiency. Hence, our 
results as a whole indicate that investor reaction to the expected synergies upon the 
announcement becomes more consistent with the effect that the expected cost saving 
synergies have on the long-run performance of the merged banks as merger activity 
becomes more intense. 
The main contribution of this paper is that we offer the first empirical evidence 
that investor reaction to expected cost saving synergies significantly changes 
depending on the number of deals concluded in the recent past. Our empirical 
findings are consistent with Houston et al. (2001) in establishing that investors can 
react positively to restructuring plans that are expected to generate cost saving 
synergies in the long run, but we go further by showing that this positive relationship 
holds only in periods of intense merger activity. We show that an increase in the 
available information decreases investors scepticism about managers’ projections. 
Our results indicate that investor scepticism about expected cost savings is mainly due 
to a lack of information needed to price the deal. When the information available to 
price the merger increases as a spillover from previous deals, the investor reaction 
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becomes more positive. We also show that the expected cost saving synergies are 
positively associated with the long-run performance of merged banks. Hence, our 
results are also in line with those of De Long and De Young (2007) in showing that in 
periods of intense merger activity investor reactions to expected costs saving are more 
consistent with the effect that these expected synergies have on the long-run 
performance of merged banks.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
relevant literature bank mergers and acquisitions as well as presenting our formal 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes our variables, data, and formal tests. Section 4 
presents our empirical analysis. Sections 5 and 6 give an overview of our results in 
regard to our two hypotheses. Section 7 presents a robustness check. Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Related Studies and Hypotheses 
Previous research shows that banks use mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to 
reorganize in response to technological and activity changes (Berger et al., 1999; 
Dymski, 1999; Group of Ten, 2001; Amel et al., 2004; Jones and Critchfield, 2005; 
De Young et al., 2009). Bank reorganization substantially affects the efficiency, 
profitability, and composition of lending portfolios. Specifically, Berger et al. (1998) 
outline how M&As affect the propensity of banks to lend to small borrowers. 
Sapienza (2002) shows that M&As increase both bank efficiency and banks’ market 
power in setting loan rates. Hannan and Pilloff (2006) find that efficient banks tend to 
acquire their more inefficient counterparts, suggesting potential post-merger 
efficiency improvements. Similarly, Fraser and Zhang (2009) demonstrate that the 
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profitability and efficiency of the target firm increases by three years after the deal 
announcement.  
The literature indicates a general consensus that the reorganization process 
substantially influences future performance of merged banks. As such, the 
reorganization plan disclosed at the merger announcement is likely to affect investors’ 
reactions to the deal. However, the effects of reorganization following the merger can 
take more than one year to be fully felt (Berger et al., 1998; Houston et al., 2001; 
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2007; Fraser and Zhang, 2009), and investors may 
have difficulty determining at announcement whether banks are likely to meet 
expected future merger gains in the long run.  
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, only one paper (Houston et al., 2001) 
directly assesses the link between expected cost saving synergies and investors’ 
reactions to deal announcements, and those authors find a positive link. However, 
Houston et al. (2001) also show that investors capitalize only half of the buyer’s 
expectation of future cost saving synergies in the stock prices of the banks involved in 
the merger, indicating some degree of investor scepticism about the manager’s 
projections. The authors show that this lower-than-expected market reaction, to some 
degree, comes from investor scepticism. Specifically, they argue that investors can 
react negatively to the disclosure of expected synergies if they believe the numbers 
are being used to justify a questionable deal. The investors’ scepticism, however, is 
surprising because in Houston et al.’s sample, the bidders’ estimates of future 
synergies are generally realized within three years of the deal announcement.  
De Long and De Young (2007) document that investor reaction to a deal 
announcement is more consistent with the long-run performance of the merged banks 
if that deal is announced in periods of intense merger activity. They attribute this 
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result to information relevant to the price of the merger spilling over from concluded 
deals. Therefore, although investors may be sceptical about the disclosed expected 
synergies in periods of restricted merger activity, when the number of deals concluded 
in the recent past increases, investor reaction becomes gradually positive. We argue 
that the number of deals concluded in the recent past moderates the investor reaction 
to the disclosure of expected cost saving. Specifically, our first hypothesis states 
  
H1: The number of deals concluded in the recent past moderates the link 
between investor reactions to the merger announcement and expected cost 
saving. 
H1 suggests that investors use the information spilling over from concluded 
deals to adjust their reaction to expected cost savings disclosed by the bidder upon the 
announcement. However, an increase in merger activity can also be generated by 
overly optimistic expectations about future economic success (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Therefore, any change in the link 
between expected cost savings and investor reaction in periods of intense merger 
activity can also be triggered by investors having overly optimistic expectations about 
the merger’s outcome. To disentangle these two alternative hypotheses, we test 
whether the higher expectations of future cost saving synergies are reflected in higher 
long-run performance of the merging banks. Our second research hypothesis is 
H2: An increase in the cost saving synergies communicated at the 




3. Data and Variables 
We first define the criteria used to select our merger sample. Section 3.1 outlines how 
we calculate the market reaction to a portfolio composed of the target and the buyer 
stocks that we use to proxy for investor reaction to the deal announcement. Section 
3.2 reports how we construct the long-run difference in performance of the merged 
banks, defined as the difference between the combined performance of the merging 
banks one year before the merger and the performance of the resulting banks three 
years after the merger announcement.  
Merger deals are selected using the following six criteria: 1) the buyer is a 
commercial or savings bank 2) the acquirer buys the entire target company; 3) both 
the acquirer and the target company are listed banks operating in the United States, 
and stock prices are available on CRSP; 4) mergers were announced between 1999 
and 2007; 5) the buyer’s accounting data one year before and three years after the 
merger announcement are available on the SNL database; and 6) accounting data of 
the target company one year before the merger announcement are available on the 
SNL database. The resulting sample includes stock and accounting data for the two 
entities involved in 167 mergers between 1999 and 2007. We end our sample period 
in 2007 to avoid distortions caused by the financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
[Insert here Table 1] 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the merger sample. The table shows 
that 2000 is the year in our sample with the highest number of mergers, followed by 
1999 and 2004. The average deal value in our sample is 891 $ Million, with the 
largest deal being the acquisition of Bank One by JP Morgan in 2004. However, the 
year with the highest average deal value in our sample is 2003, when we observe two 
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large deals: the acquisition of Fleet Bank by Bank of America and the acquisition of 
First Virginia Bank by BB&T. 
Our focus variable is the expected cost saving synergies generated by expense 
reductions at the target firm, as estimated by the bidder. The cost savings are 
disclosed as a percentage of the target’s expenses and arise from closing target 
branches, selling underperforming assets, or generally downsizing the target. These 
expected synergies are higher than 0 for roughly half of our sample (85 mergers) and 
range from 7% to the 60% of the target expenses. Following De Long and De Young 
(2007), for each deal  , we allow investors to learn from observing the public 
information spilling over from concluded deals. We construct three learning variables. 
The first,      
   counts the number of deals announced by any banks in the last 365 
calendar days before the deal’s announcement. The other two variables,      
  and 
     
 , count, respectively, the number of deals announced in the previous 730 and 
1095 calendar days before the announcement of the i-th deal in the sample. To 
distinguish the information spillover from the effect of a bank’s merger experience, 
we include the control variable learning by doing. We construct three different 
learning by doing variables that count the number of deals announced by the same 
bank in the previous 365, 730, or 1095 calendar days. We also control for the target’s 
weight based on the total assets of the entity resulting from the merger. For each deal, 
we construct three proxies for the level of diversification achieved through the 
merger. The first two variables concern geographical diversification: the variable 
                 takes a value of 1 if some of the target bank’s and bidder’s offices or 
branches are located in different counties. The second variable for geographical 
diversification,            , takes a value of 1 if all buyer and target bank offices and 
branches are located in different counties, and 0 otherwise. The activity diversification 
20 
variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the correlation between the target 
company and the acquirer’s stock is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. We 
also control for the method of payment, constructing a dummy that takes a value of 1 
if the majority of the consideration was paid in shares, and 0 otherwise. We add a 
count variable (       ) for the number of deals that occurred in the same year in the 
US state in which the target bank of deal   has its headquarters. This variable aims to 
control for potential geographical drivers of merger activity such as regulation 
differences. We also add a dummy variable for the accounting method used by the 
buyer to record the deal; it takes a value 1 if the acquisition is considered a purchase, 
which allows banks to amortize the difference between the target company’s market 
value and the acquisition value. Finally, we also add a dummy named “equals,” which 
is 1 if the deal was announced as a “merger of equals” and 0 otherwise. The 
information about the mergers is collected from SNL, and we matched the M&A and 
the firms’ databases using CUSIP codes. Table 2 describes all these variables and 
Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics. 
[Insert here Table 2 and 3] 
Table 3 reports the percentiles of the focus variables. Of particular importance 
to our analysis, Table 3 shows that the mean of the variable learning by observing 
calculated over the last 365 calendar days is 1.78 with a standard deviation of 3.88. 
Table 3 also reports the percentile values. For example, the 25
th
 percentile value for 
the variable learning by observing calculated over 365 days is 1.45 and the median 
value is 1.74. Similarly, the table reports the summary statistics and the percentile 
values for all the learning variables. Table 3 also shows that the variable expected 
costs saving has a mean of 14.35 and a standard deviation of 15.86.      
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[Insert here Table 4] 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation as 
controls. The target represents, on average, 16.95% of the entity resulting from the 
merger.                
 
 is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the target and the 
buyer have some branches or offices in the different US county, and 0 otherwise. This 
variable has a mean of 0.21. The variable             takes the value of 1 when all the 
branches of the target are located in a county where the bidder has no branches, and 0 
otherwise. This variable has a mean of 0.43. In our sample, roughly 2.39% of the 
mergers are announced as mergers between equals. Moreover, in 47.30% of the 
analyzed deals, the majority of the consideration was paid in stocks, and 77.24% of 
the deals were recorded as purchases. 
 
3.1 Investor Valuation  
We use an event study methodology to proxy the investor reaction upon the merger 
announcement. Specifically, we run the following market model using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) for each firm involved in a merger in our dataset:  
                                                                                                         
    is the daily return of the NASDAQ bank index,           indexes the mergers, 
and t (-252, -20) indexes the days prior to the merger announcement.     is either the 
daily return of the acquiring bank    
 , the market return of the target’s stock    
 , or the 
return of the combined market value of both financial firms    
  calculated as: 
   
    [     
      
          
        
  ]                 
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  is the market value of the acquiring bank at day t, and     
  is the market value of 
the target company at day t. Finally, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) for three different time windows starting 10 or five days before the acquisition 
and ending at T= 1,5 days after the announcement.  
              ∑       ̂    ̂    
 
    
                           
From equation (3), we then obtain three different CARs (-5,5), (-10,5), and (-10,1),
1
 
which are reported in Table 5. Because our focus is on the expected synergies 
generated by the merger, we next turn to the abnormal returns on the combined 
portfolio     
 . 
[Insert here table 5] 
The CARs reported in Table 5 show that the announcement of banking 
mergers, on average, destroys acquiring banks’ shareholder wealth, whereas the 
shareholders of the target earn strong positive abnormal returns. In addition, the deal 
announcement does not have a statistically significant effect on the portfolio of the 
target and buyer stocks.  
 
3.2 Long-run Merger Gains 
We define long-run merger gains as the difference between the combined 
performance of the merging banks one year before the merger announcement and the 
                                                        
1 For the portfolio of the combined target and buyer stocks, we also test whether investors anticipated 
the merger, discounting part of the deal effect before the announcement. Specifically, for the combined 
portfolio, we calculate the abnormal return on the windows (-40, -1) and (-20,-1) and find no evidence 
of an anticipation effect: neither of the abnormal returns is statistically distinguishable from zero. 
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performance of the resulting bank three years after the merger. This time gap is 
consistent with the literature (Berger et al., 1998; Houston et al., 2001; De Long and 
De Young, 2007), which shows that the full effect of the merger only becomes clear 
three years after its announcement. 
We address three types of gains: profits, interest margin
2
, and cost efficiency. 
Following De Long and De Young (2007), we use accounting ratios from before and 
after the deal. Specifically, we use the return on assets (ROA) to measure profits, the 
ratio of net interest income to total assets to measure the interest margin, and the ratio 
of non-interest expenses to operating income to measure cost efficiency. 
 Because we restrict our sample to deals in which the entire target company 
was acquired, we can construct a combined performance (    ) for each deal ( ) 
announced in year ( ), weighting the stand-alone performances of the acquiring bank 
(  
 ) and the target company (  
   on their relevance in terms of weight (Total Assets) 
in the resulting firm: 
         
 
    
 
    
      
      
 
    
 
    
      
                
Finally, we construct our proxy for actual generated merger gains for the i-th 
bank at time t by subtracting the combined performance one year before the deal from 
the realised performance (   
 ) of the resulting bank three years after the merger 
announcement: 
                     
                                    
                                                        
2 While the effect of expected cost saving on profitability and on cost efficiency 
appears to be clear, higher cost efficiency may also increase the interest 
revenues. This would reduce the bank’s marginal costs and lead to an increase in 
the banks market shares and as a result to a larger interest margin. 
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    stands for ROA, interest margin, and cost efficiency. Table 6 reports summary 
statistics for all actual synergies resulting from equation    . 
[Insert here table 6] 
 Table 6 indicates how the long performance of merged banks differs during 
periods of intense merger activity. Specifically, the long-run difference in profitability 
(ROA) is negative (-0.0077) in periods of low merger activity but becomes slightly 
positive (0.0008) when merger activity becomes more intense. The same dynamic is 
also apparent in the difference in the interest margin, which becomes less negative in 
periods of intense merger activity, and in regard to cost efficiency, even though the 
mean in periods of intense merger activity is not significant. This evidence is 
consistent with De Long and De Young (2007), suggesting that managers tend to 
perform better in periods of intense merger activity. We then test whether the 
investors consider the management estimates more reliable in periods of intense 
merger activity.  
 
4. Empirical Framework  
We test our first hypothesis using the following equation: 
                                                                                
                                 
We estimate equation (6) using industry-year fixed effects. The dependent 
variable (      ) is the CAR
3
 of deal   announced in year  , where the buyer has the 
                                                        
3
 We implicitly assume that the estimation error in the CAR calculation is not correlated with the 
independent variables used in the paper. Therefore, equation 6 can be consistently estimated using a 
least squares technique. 
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SIC code j. The coefficient on the interaction between the variable learning by 
observing and the estimated cost saving synergies    is our test for H1, which posits 
that the number of deals concluded in the recent past moderates the link between 
investor reaction and the expected cost saving synergies.  
 To test our second hypothesis, we use as the dependent variable              
and use the following equation: 
                
                                                         
                 
We estimate equation (7) using industry-year fixed effects.                 is 
the difference between the combined performance of the target and the bidder one 
year before the deal and the performance of the bank resulting from the merger three 
years after the deal. The coefficient on the expected cost saving synergies    is our 
test for our second hypothesis (H2), which holds that the expected cost saving 
synergies positively affect the long-run performance of the bank resulting from the 
merger. 
 
5 Investor Reaction and the Expected Cost Saving Synergies  
Table 7 reports the estimation of equation 6 using industry-year fixed effects. We 
use as a dependent variable the CARs calculated on three different event widows:  
(-5,5), (-10,5), and (-10,1) and three different measure for our learning variables that 
we calculate on a time horizon of: 365 calendar days (     
 and       
 ), 730 days 
(     
 and       
 ) and 1095 (     
 and       
 ) calendar days. 
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[Insert here Table 7] 
 
Our results confirm hypothesis H1: the link between investor reaction and 
expected costs saving synergies is substantially moderated by the number of deals 
concluded in the recent past. The coefficient on the interaction between the expected 
cost saving synergies and our variable learning by observing (     
  , which is our test 
for H1, is positive and statistically significant (p<0.10), irrespective of the time 
horizon used to calculate the learning variables or the event window used to calculate 
the CARs. In only one event window (5,5) the interaction is not statistically 
significant if we calculate the learning by observing variable on a time horizon of two 
calendar years (730 days). However, using the other two learning variables, calculated 
respectively on 365 and on 730 calendar days, the interaction between the variable 
learning by observing and the expected cost savings becomes positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.10) even in the window (-5,5). The results outlined in Table 7 show 
that the moderation effect of the variable learning by observing on the link between 
expected cost savings and CARs is more statistically significant if we use a time 
horizon of 365 calendar days to calculate the learning variables. This evidence 
suggests that investors assign more weight to more recent deals.
4
   
We now turn our attention to the first three models, where we use learning 
variables calculated on a time horizon of 365 calendar days. The estimated coefficient 
on the interaction between the variable learning by observing and expected cost 
                                                        
4
 To understand whether investors assign more weight to more recent information, we also calculate 
two weighted learning by observing variables:      
   and      
      . The variable       
    is 
constructed by assigning more weight to older deals, and the variable      
       is constructed by 
assigning more weight to deals closer in time to the announcement of the i-th deal. The unreported 
results confirm the evidence in Table 7 that investors assign more weight to more recent information. 
These results are available upon request. 
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saving is 0.00116 (p<0.10) in Model 1, which uses the event window (-5,5); 0.00184 
(p<0.05) in Model 2, which uses the event window (-10,5); and 0.00202 (p<0.01) in 
Model 3, which uses the event window (-10,1). 
We find that the number of deals concluded in the recent past moderates the 
link between investor reaction and expected cost saving synergies by weakening the 
negative effect of announced cost saving on CARs. Moreover, this moderation effect 
is strong enough to change the sign of the relation. Specifically, in Model 2 the link 
between expected cost savings and the investor reaction is negative if the variable 
learning by doing is below the relevant threshold of 1.93, which falls into 
approximately the 75
th
 percentile of the learning variable. However, when the 
learning variable increases above 1.93, the link between cost savings and investor 
reaction becomes positive. As an example, when few deals have been communicated 
in the recent past and the variable learning by observing lies in its 25
th
 percentile 
(1.45), a one standard deviation increase in the expected cost saving synergies (15.86) 
decreases the CAR by an economically meaningful 1.41%. This effect is highly 
statistically significant (p<0.01). However, when merger activity becomes more 
intense and the variable learning by observing assumes a value in its 75
th
 percentile 
(1.98), this negative effect disappears. A one standard deviation increase in the 
expected cost saving synergies would then increase investor reaction in the event 
window (-10,5) by 0.13%. This effect, however, is not statistically significant given 
that the value of the variable learning by observing is very close to the switching 
point. However, Table 7 shows that this effect becomes gradually more positive and 
statistically significant when the learning variable increases above the 75
th
 percentile, 
approaching the tail of the distribution. This evidence is consistent with H1 in 
indicating that the number of deals concluded in the recent past substantially 
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moderates the link between expected cost savings and investor reaction to the deal 
announcement. Our evidence suggests that the information spilling over from deals 
announced in the recent past leads investors to adjust upward their reactions to the 
bidder’s expected cost saving synergies. 
Our results also show that the announcement of deals that involve larger banks 
tend to generate lower abnormal returns. The natural logarithm of the buyer’s total 
assets has a negative and significant (p<0.10) effect in all the models reported in 
Table 7. 
 
6. Merger Gains and Expected Cost Saving Synergies  
Table 8 reports the estimation of Equation 7 using industry-year fixed effects. Our 
dependent variable is the merger gains calculated as described in Section 3.2.  
Specifically, we present three types of merger gains: profits, interest margin, and 
efficiency gains, which are calculated as the long-run difference in ROA, interest 
margin, and cost efficiency (non-interest expenses to operating income), respectively. 
 
[Insert here Table 8] 
 
Our results in Table 8 confirm hypothesis H2, which posits that an increase in 
the expected cost saving synergies increases the long-run performance of the merged 
banks. The coefficient on the expected cost savings is positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.1) in all of the models that use the ROA or the interest margin as a 
dependent variable. Specifically, in Models 1 and 3 the link between the expected cost 
saving synergies and the long-run difference in performance is 0.00010 (p<0.05) for the 
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long-run difference in ROA and 0.00005 (p<0.1) for the long-run difference in the 
interest margin. A one standard deviation (15.885) increase in the expected cost 
saving synergies generates an increase in the long-run difference in ROA of 0.16%. 
Using the average acquiring bank ROA one year before the deal announcement 
(1.26%) as a benchmark, this represents an increase of 12.59%. We find that the 
interest margin has a similar effect: a one standard deviation increase in the expected 
cost saving synergies generates a 0.08% increase in the long-run difference in the 
interest margin. Using the average acquiring firm interest margin one year before the 
deal announcement (3.67%) as a benchmark, this represents a 2.16% increase. 
Table 8 also reports qualitatively similar results when we look at the long-run 
differences in cost efficiency. Specifically, the coefficient estimated in Model 2, 
which uses the long-run difference in efficiency as a dependent variable, is negative 
and statistically significant (p<0.10) at -0.00122. Thus, a one standard deviation 
increase in expected cost saving synergies, on average, decreases the ratio of non-
interest expenses to operating income by 1.93%. Using the average acquiring bank 
efficiency ratio (57.78%) one year before the deal as a benchmark, this translates into 
a decrease of 2.47%.  
Our results show that an increase in the expected cost saving synergies 
communicated at the announcement date is positively associated with the long-run 
performance of the merging banks. A one standard deviation increase in the expected 
cost saving synergies generates an improvement in all of the analyzed long-run 
differences in accounting performance. The variable learning by observing does not 
have a statistically significant effect on the long-run performance of merging banks in 
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our sample, irrespective of the time horizon used to calculate the learning variable.
5
  
Learning by doing is positively associated with the long-run difference in the interest 
margin when we calculate the learning variable on a time horizon of one year. 
However, this relation is not statistically significant when we use a greater number of 
days to calculate the variable. 
7. Robustness Check 
In the previous section, we analyzed how the number of deals concluded in the recent 
past substantially moderates the link between investor reaction and the acquiring 
bank’s estimation of cost saving synergies. This relationship is positive only in 
periods of high merger activity. The negative relationship in periods of low merger 
activity could stem from investors believing that the announced cost savings estimates 
are being used by the acquiring bank to justify a questionable deal.  
 In this section, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-step selection model to test 
whether the acquiring bank’s decision to communicate cost savings synergies higher 
than zero is based on unobserved characteristics of the banks involved in the deal that 
are negatively correlated with the investor reaction upon the deal announcement. The 
two-step model requires strong distributional assumptions, and therefore the results 
reported in Table 9 have to be considered with caution.  
 To use the selection model, we collapse the expectation of cost saving 
synergies into a dummy variable taking a value of one if the expected synergies 
disclosed at the announcement date are higher than zero. In the first step, we run a 
probit model using the cost-savings dummy as the dependent variable and the same 
independent variable as used in the main analysis. We then augment equation (6) with 
                                                        
5 We also test whether the number of deals concluded in the recent past moderates the link between 
merger gains and expected cost saving synergies. Because the estimated coefficients are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero, we do not report these results. 
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an inverse Mills ratio calculated with the parameters estimated in the first stage. 
We use a measure of barriers to out-of-the-state entry as an instrument to 
determine the likelihood that the buyer expects to achieve cost saving synergies 
higher than zero. As outlined in Rice and Strahan (2010), the 1994 Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) allowed nationwide branching, but it also 
permitted states to limit out-of-the-state entries. These entry barriers fall into four 
categories: 1) states can decide a minimum age of the target before it can be acquired 
by out-of-state banks; 2) states can also opt to forbid new interstate branching; 3) each 
state can decide whether to allow entry through the acquisition of a single branch or 
part of a target institution; and 4) the states can also impose a statewide deposit cap on 
branch acquisitions. The branch restriction index changes across time and states. After 
the approval of IBBEA in 1994, all but 13 states imposed a minimum age for the 
target in an interstate acquisition. Moreover, the majority of states (36) did not opt-in 
for de novo entry. Entry through the acquisition of only one branch or part of an 
institution was also forbidden in 30 states after passage of IBBEA, and 35 states 
imposed a cap of 30% or higher on the amount of deposits in the state that can be held 
or controlled by any single bank or bank holding after an interstate acquisition that 
constitutes an initial entry. As discussed by Rice and Strahan (2010), an attempt to 
eliminate these branch restrictions was made in 2006. However, the attempt did not 
succeed and the entry barriers limited the acquisition from out-of-the-state banks in 
our sample period from 1999 to 2007. These barriers may impede efficient banks 
from acquiring their less efficient peers, limiting the expected cost saving achievable 
through the acquisition. 
 
[Insert here Table 9] 
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Table 9 reports the results estimated using the selection model. Model (1) 
reports the results from the probit estimation used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio. 
As anticipated, the link between the branch restriction index and the expected cost 
savings dummy is negative and highly statistically significant (p<0.01), indicating 
that the branch restrictions hindered efficient banks from acquiring less efficient 
target companies. The coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is our test for selection on 
unobservable factors. Models (2), (3), and (4) show that the coefficient on the inverse 
Mills ratio is not statistically distinguishable from 0 in all models. Thus, we have no 
evidence of selection on unobserved characteristics of the merging banks. Moreover, 
the moderation effect of the number of concluded deals in the recent past (       
 ) on 
the link between the expected cost savings dummy and the investor reaction to the 
announcement is still positive and significant (p<0.1) in all of the event windows.  
Therefore, the selection model confirms the results reported in the main analysis that 
as the number of deals concluded in the recent past increases, so too does the investor 
reaction to estimated cost savings. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Recent decades have seen intense merger activity in the US banking industry. This 
consolidation, principally brought on by reorganization following important 
regulatory and technological changes, has completely transformed banking activity. 
The reorganization of the banks involved in such mergers then assumes great 
relevance. Often upon the deal announcement, the bidder bank discloses its 
expectations about expected cost savings from reorganization of the target. The extant 
literature shows that upon the announcement of the merger, investors do not fully 
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capitalize on the market prices of the banks involved in the deal the estimated cost 
saving disclosed by the buyer (Houston et al. 2001). This is surprising because 
research shows that the buyer expectations are generally met within three years of the 
merger (Houston et al. 2001). A possible explanation for this result is that investors, at 
the announcement date, discount part of the expected synergies because they do not 
have enough information to accurately evaluate the long-run effect of the 
reorganization plan. De Long and De Young (2007) show that investors use the 
information spilling over from deals concluded in the recent past to price the merger 
announcement. We examine whether the number of deals concluded in the recent past 
moderates the link between cost saving synergies disclosed at the announcement date 
and investor reactions. We use a sample of 167 acquisitions announced by US banks 
between 1999 and 2007, and collect information on expected cost saving synergies 
communicated at the deal announcements. We find that the number of deals 
concluded in the recent past substantially moderates the link between investors’ 
reactions and expected cost saving synergies communicated at the announcement 
date. We show that the moderation effect is strong enough to invert the sign of the 
association between investors’ reactions and cost saving synergies. Stock market 
participants seem to interpret the disclosure of expected cost savings as a justification 
for questionable deals in periods of low merger activity, when the link between 
investor reaction and expected synergies is negative. However, when the number of 
deals increases, this link becomes positive.   
 We also test whether the expected cost savings at the announcement date are 
systematically correlated with unobserved characteristics of the deal that negatively 
affect investor reaction, but we do not find clear evidence to support this idea. 
 Finally, we show that the cost saving synergies communicated at the 
34 
announcement date are positively associated with the long-run performance of 
merging banks. Hence, during periods of intense merger activity, investor reactions to 
expected cost savings become more consistent with the effect that these expected 
synergies have on the long-run performance of merged banks. This evidence is 
consistent with De Long and De Young (2007) in suggesting that information relevant 
to pricing the merger spills over from concluded deals.  
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Average size of 
the buyer: Total 
Assets (Mil) 
Average size of 






   
  
1999 29 33,900 951 500  
2000 30 41,900 1,283 548  
2001 17 27,900 4,443 592  
2002 11 33,300 2,588 128  
2003 18 69,300 920 2,760  
2004 23 39,700 1,084 2,384  
2005 8 17,500 2,801 349  
2006 11 40,600 786 388  
2007 20 63,200 3,071 366  










Table 2: Variables description 
Variable name Abbreviation Description Source 
Expected cost 
saving (%)         
The percentage of expense reductions at the 





      
 
      
        
  
The ratio of the assets of the target the year 
before the deal to the total assets of both banks 





      
  The number of deals announced by any banks 
in the recent past before the announcement of 
deal  . We construct three learning 
variables:(1)      
   for the number of deals 
communicated by any bank in the previous 365 
calendar days; (2) a variable counting the 
number of deals communicated in the previous 
730 calendar days (     
 );  and (3) a variable 
counting the number of deals communicated in 
the previous 1095 calendar days (     
 ).  
SNL 
M&A 
Learning by doing         
  The number of all deals announced by the 
same bank in the recent past, before the 
announcement of deal  . We construct three 
variable: (1)       
   counting the number of 
deals announced by the same bank in the 
previous 365 calendar days; (2)       
   
counting the number of deals announced by the 
same bank in the previous 730 calendar days; 
and (3)       
   counting the number of deals 
communicated by the same bank in the 





                  A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
target company and acquirer offices are partly 
located in different counties. 
 
Geographical 
diversification (2)  
             A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if all the 
target branches and offices are located in 





          A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
correlation between the acquirer and target 
company stock is below the sample median, 




         A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
merger was announced as a “merger of 
equals,” and 0 otherwise 
SNL 
M&A 
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Accounting 
method used to 
incorporate the 
target company 
         Post-merger accounting ratios can change if 
the acquirer bank uses the pooling method 
versus the purchase method to incorporate the 
target company into its books (De Long, 
2003).       is a dummy variable equal to 1 




Payment method            A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
majority of the consideration was paid in 
stock, 0 otherwise 
SNL 
M&A 
Dimension of the 
acquiring bank  






the bank resulting 





    
The difference between the target company 
and acquirer combined leverage (eq.2), one 
year before and the leverage of the bank 




Number of deals 
occurred in the 
state of the buyer 
        The number of deals that occurred in the same 





reaction to recent 
deals 
            The average investor reaction (cumulative 






                     
        
The regulatory restrictions to out-of-the state 
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1.98 4.17 8.47 
1 3 4 25  
99  
3.32 6.84 9.84 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
 mean Standard 
deviation 
max min 
Target relative dimension  
      
 
      
        
   
0.1695 0.2434 0.02 0.9765 
Partial overlapping                      0.2155 0.4124 0 1 
No overlap                 0.4371 0.4975 0 1 
Activity diversification              0.5149 0.5012 0 1 
Merger between equals            0.0239 0.1533 0 1 
Accounting method used to incorporate the target    
           
0.7724 0.4205 0 1 
Payment method               0.4730 0.5077 0 1 
Size of the acquiring bank                     15.9984 1.8591 11.1711 20.2610 
Difference in Capitalization of the bank resulting from the 
merger                  
 
  
     
0.0749 0.3026 -0.7512 2.9719 
Number of deals occurred in the state of the buyer       
          
5.3353 4.2420 1 21 
Average market reaction to the five most recent deals 
              
-0.0272 0.0429 -0.2073 0.05760 
Branch restriction index (                     
         
1.6587 1.4260 0 4 








Table 5: Summary statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table reports the average cumulative abnormal returns. The Z-statistic reported in parentheses is 
adjusted for cross-sectional correlation, following the procedure suggested by Kolari and Pynnönen 
(2010) and used by Amici et al (2013).  





























N 167 167 167 











Table 6:Summary statistics of created synergies 
This table presents the results for the realized merger gain calculated as the difference 
between the performances of the buyer three years after the deal      
   and the 
weighted average of the buyer’s and target’s performance one year before the deal. 
                     
  (     
 
      
 
      
        
       
 
      
 
      
        
  )                      
The table presents the results from the above equation substituting    and     
respectively, with the buyer and the target return on asset (     ), net interest 
income on total asset (                 ), and the ratio of non-interest expenses to 
operating income (            ). Low merger activity refers to merger with the 
variable        below the sample median, while high merger activity refers to deals 
with the variable        above the sample median. 





         
 
-0.0035*** -0.0077*** 0.0008* 
 




                     
 
-0.0034*** -0.0043*** -0.0027*** 
 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
                
 
0.0422*** 0.0899*** -0.0099 
  (0.0127) (0.0022) (0.0095) 
Observations  167 167 167 






Table 7: Market reaction on combined CARs 
       This table reports the estimation of the following model using time-industry dummies: 
                                                                                                              
       The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
 Learning variables 365 days Learning variables 730 days Learning variables 1095 days 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Car -5,5 Car -10,5 Car -10,1 Car -5,5 Car -10,5 Car -10,1 Car -5,5 Car -10,5 Car -10,1 
         -0.00249** -0.00356** -0.00398*** -0.00147* -0.00187** -0.00203** -0.00189** -0.00214** -0.00191** 
 (0.00118) (0.00137) (0.00111) (0.00078) (0.00094) (0.00079) (0.00085) (0.00095) (0.00082) 
       
  -0.01030 -0.01496 -0.04052 0.00781 0.00296 -0.01211 0.00938 0.00328 -0.01149 
 (0.02520) (0.03155) (0.02485) (0.01511) (0.01758) (0.01476) (0.01339) (0.01614) (0.01248) 
                
  0.00116* 0.00184** 0.00202*** 0.00027 0.00041* 0.00043** 0.00023* 0.00030* 0.00026** 
 (0.00064) (0.00077) (0.00062) (0.00017) (0.00024) (0.00019) (0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00013) 
        
  0.00116 0.00192 0.00332 0.00303 0.00181 0.00071 0.00113 0.00009 -0.00047 
 (0.00322) (0.00335) (0.00295) (0.00241) (0.00246) (0.00231) (0.00180) (0.00187) (0.00159) 
       
 
       
         
  
-0.01522 0.02823 0.03220 -0.01520 0.02658 0.03108 -0.01599 0.02555 0.03089 
 (0.02590) (0.02958) (0.02806) (0.02523) (0.02904) (0.02791) (0.02548) (0.02930) (0.02816) 
           -0.00798 -0.00493 -0.00259 -0.00922 -0.00595 -0.00355 -0.00928 -0.00620 -0.00310 
 (0.00943) (0.01047) (0.00857) (0.00937) (0.01048) (0.00879) (0.00965) (0.01055) (0.00904) 
                   0.00301 0.00525 0.01152 0.00287 0.00657 0.01439 0.00358 0.00770 0.01499 
 (0.01263) (0.01314) (0.01104) (0.01221) (0.01312) (0.01125) (0.01246) (0.01297) (0.01138) 
              0.00093 0.00385 0.00695 0.00191 0.00488 0.00748 0.00260 0.00583 0.00768 
 (0.01156) (0.01159) (0.01060) (0.01142) (0.01161) (0.01049) (0.01135) (0.01167) (0.01049) 
          0.00376 0.01169 0.00116 0.00796 0.01447 0.00084 0.00256 0.01206 0.00554 
 (0.02579) (0.04126) (0.02821) (0.02580) (0.04131) (0.02954) (0.02579) (0.04114) (0.03128) 
          -0.00007 0.01095 0.00988 -0.00003 0.01263 0.01410 -0.00035 0.01294 0.01467 
 (0.01748) (0.01805) (0.01456) (0.01641) (0.01779) (0.01554) (0.01649) (0.01764) (0.01552) 
            -0.00798 -0.01798 -0.00765 -0.00940 -0.01750 -0.00512 -0.00818 -0.01563 -0.00336 
 (0.01165) (0.01301) (0.01140) (0.01231) (0.01367) (0.01183) (0.01227) (0.01357) (0.01183) 
           -0.00852* -0.00836* -0.00811** -0.01028** -0.00931* -0.00795** -0.00966** -0.00871* -0.00741** 
 (0.00455) (0.00481) (0.00379) (0.00457) (0.00472) (0.00373) (0.00447) (0.00467) (0.00368) 
         0.00114 0.00110 0.00089 0.00150 0.00114 0.00061 0.00118 0.00082 0.00042 




     0.01365 0.01210 -0.00010 0.01241 0.01270 0.00227 0.01337 0.01249 -0.00053 
 (0.01669) (0.01648) (0.01147) (0.01561) (0.01616) (0.01149) (0.01475) (0.01532) (0.01128) 
             0.08418 0.08369 0.09565 0.07328 0.08207 0.09954 0.08361 0.09283 0.10409 
 (0.10395) (0.11817) (0.10198) (0.10853) (0.11851) (0.10200) (0.10688) (0.11739) (0.10220) 
         0.12982 0.12229 0.17900** 0.07667 0.08334 0.16323 0.03407 0.06917 0.19398 
 (0.09186) (0.09917) (0.08523) (0.10895) (0.12099) (0.10503) (0.13527) (0.15896) (0.12666) 
             167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
    
             
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Switching point 2.1466 1.9348 1.9703 5.4444 4.5610 4.7209 8.2174 7.1333 7.3462 
    
      
  Evaluated at different level of        
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Table 8: Regression on post-merger performance 
      This table reports the coefficients estimated using time-industry dummies when estimating the model below. We use the long-run difference 
      in ROA, (       ), the long-run difference in the interest margin (                  ), and the long-run difference in the non-interest   
      expenses to operating income ratio (              ) as a proxy for               . 
 
                                                                             
      The standard errors, reported in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity.. 
 Learning variables 365 days Learning variables 730 days Learning variables 1095 days 




INT. INC. ROA 
COST 
EFFIC. 




         0.00010** -0.00122* 0.00005* 0.00010** -0.00126* 0.00005* 0.00011*** -0.00130* 0.00006** 
 (0.00004) (0.00071) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00072) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00074) (0.00003) 
       
  -0.00084 0.03206 -0.00078 -0.00119 0.01235 -0.00112 -0.00103 0.00558 -0.00140 
 (0.00252) (0.04910) (0.00211) (0.00137) (0.02512) (0.00129) (0.00118) (0.02529) (0.00118) 
        
  -0.00015 0.00138 0.00058** -0.00027 0.00504 -0.00002 -0.00021 0.00312 -0.00011 
 (0.00032) (0.00579) (0.00024) (0.00027) (0.00472) (0.00019) (0.00018) (0.00319) (0.00013) 
       
 
       
         
  
-0.00250 0.09432 -0.00202 -0.00272 0.09335 -0.00177 -0.00267 0.09190 -0.00178 
 (0.00443) (0.08357) (0.00326) (0.00439) (0.08337) (0.00326) (0.00439) (0.08360) (0.00323) 
           0.00087 -0.03142 -0.00056 0.00091 -0.03130 -0.00047 0.00080 -0.02902 -0.00046 
 (0.00123) (0.02620) (0.00094) (0.00122) (0.02598) (0.00098) (0.00121) (0.02551) (0.00097) 
                   -0.00131 0.03558 -0.00089 -0.00119 0.03404 -0.00072 -0.00123 0.03438 -0.00075 
 (0.00209) (0.04203) (0.00107) (0.00207) (0.04154) (0.00110) (0.00207) (0.04187) (0.00109) 
              0.00124 -0.02484 0.00083 0.00123 -0.02304 0.00071 0.00121 -0.02323 0.00063 
 (0.00145) (0.02636) (0.00097) (0.00144) (0.02640) (0.00100) (0.00143) (0.02637) (0.00100) 
          0.00070 0.06222 -0.00249 0.00025 0.07098 -0.00253 0.00071 0.06699 -0.00210 
 (0.00292) (0.06445) (0.00322) (0.00277) (0.06335) (0.00327) (0.00276) (0.06412) (0.00314) 
          -0.00042 0.01700 0.00007 -0.00035 0.01625 0.00055 -0.00030 0.01624 0.00064 
 (0.00164) (0.03838) (0.00178) (0.00167) (0.03844) (0.00176) (0.00165) (0.03796) (0.00175) 
            -0.00028 0.01860 0.00002 -0.00005 0.01514 0.00025 -0.00001 0.01563 0.00040 
 (0.00166) (0.03145) (0.00115) (0.00161) (0.03071) (0.00118) (0.00165) (0.03143) (0.00118) 
           0.00016 0.00497 -0.00011 0.00024 0.00254 0.00017 0.00025 0.00305 0.00025 
 (0.00044) (0.00792) (0.00035) (0.00045) (0.00802) (0.00035) (0.00042) (0.00737) (0.00036) 
         0.00001 0.00059 -0.00016 -0.00003 0.00115 -0.00020* -0.00001 0.00076 -0.00021** 




     -0.00262 0.01685 -0.00165 -0.00243 0.01260 -0.00144 -0.00252 0.01299 -0.00153 
 (0.00191) (0.03332) (0.00128) (0.00180) (0.03239) (0.00131) (0.00180) (0.03320) (0.00127) 
             0.03104 -0.45312 0.00619 0.03181* -0.46579 0.00807 0.03186* -0.46338 0.00861 
 (0.01879) (0.33528) (0.01280) (0.01873) (0.33301) (0.01332) (0.01850) (0.33004) (0.01344) 
         0.00017 -0.17907 -0.00249 0.00495 -0.15654 -0.00033 0.00695 -0.13416 0.00478 
 (0.00885) (0.16801) (0.00770) (0.01052) (0.20063) (0.00957) (0.01308) (0.28017) (0.01187) 
             167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
   
       
    
             
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Selection model on CARs 
This table reports the estimation of a two-step selection model. In the first step, we estimate a probit 
model using as the dependent variable a dummy taking a value of one if         the expected 
communicated cost saving synergies, are higher than 0. In the second step, we estimate the following 
regression using industry and time dummies:   
                                                                                          
                              
The variable        is the Mills ratio calculated using the parameters estimated in the first stage . The 
standard errors reported in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          Car -5,5 Car -10,5 Car -10,1 
                     
       -0.28879***    
 (0.08882)    
         
 
-0.00253** -0.00361*** -0.00408*** 
  
(0.00118) (0.00138) (0.00110) 
       
  0.71279 -0.00655 -0.00837 -0.03375 
 
(0.64054) (0.02385) (0.03083) (0.02555) 
        
  0.03232 0.00052 0.00146 0.00337 
 (0.07910) (0.00314) (0.00319) (0.00282) 
                 
 
0.00115* 0.00179** 0.00198*** 
  
(0.00063) (0.00078) (0.00063) 
       
 
       
         
   -0.04148 -0.00381 0.04052 0.04322 
 (0.82421) (0.02653) (0.03012) (0.02662) 
           -0.84932*** -0.00928 -0.00728 -0.00570 
 (0.25182) (0.00964) (0.01079) (0.00877) 
                   0.58032 -0.00165 0.00076 0.00798 
 (0.36836) (0.01219) (0.01278) (0.01100) 
              -0.34071 0.00031 0.00165 0.00370 
 (0.28811) (0.01121) (0.01099) (0.01012) 
          -1.00060 0.00499 0.00786 -0.00536 
 (0.68603) (0.02801) (0.04435) (0.03101) 
          -0.25980 0.00438 0.01542 0.01242 
 (0.39741) (0.01696) (0.01763) (0.01462) 
            -0.34438 -0.01282 -0.02236* -0.01013 
 (0.33884) (0.01121) (0.01273) (0.01161) 
           0.12490 -0.00598 -0.00589 -0.00650* 
 (0.10577) (0.00421) (0.00437) (0.00358) 
         0.01913 0.00156 0.00150 0.00118 




     0.37657 0.01690 0.01711 0.00441 
 (0.46560) (0.01708) (0.01665) (0.01135) 
             1.01676 0.09175 0.09638 0.10149 
 (2.87816) (0.09776) (0.10899) (0.09456) 
          0.00438 0.00851 0.00874 
  (0.00617) (0.00700) (0.00655) 
          -2.67078 0.08342 0.07257 0.14244* 
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 (2.34129) (0.08919) (0.09719) (0.08561) 
   
 
 
            152 152 152 152 
                 Y Y Y Y 
Switching point  2.200 2.017 2.060 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 














































 Abstract: a common assumption in the academic literature and in banking 
supervision is that competition decreases the profitability of banks. However, recent 
literature suggests that competition affects the profitability of banks in two opposing 
ways: it decreases interest revenues by lowering the banks’ market power in setting 
rates on loans but also incentivizes banks to improve their technology to assess credit 
risk, decreasing the average loan losses in bank lending portfolios. In periods of credit 
expansion, such as periods of high expectation for future economic success (i.e. high 
optimism), the ability of banks to assess credit risk may be particularly valuable. I 
examine whether economic optimism moderates the relationship between banking 
competition and bank performance in the United States. I use the entry barriers 
erected by states to limit out-of-state entry after the approval of the Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act to measure changes in competition that are not 
correlated with bank characteristics. I use two different measures for the level of 
optimism in the economy: the Consumer Sentiment Index calculated by the 
University of Michigan and a measure based on the exercising of options by CEOs in 
companies listed on the NYSE. I find that the level of optimism in the economy 
decreases the positive relation between entry barriers and bank profitability. In 
periods of high optimism and after the introduction of entry barriers, credit losses 




A standard principle in banking supervision is that competition decreases banks’ 
profits (Jiménez et al. 2013).  In line with this principle, recent empirical evidence 
(Rice and Strahan 2010) shows that banking competition reduces the market power of 
banks in setting loan rates, decreasing the average lending rate. The reduction in the 
average lending rate, however, can be associated with a decrease in the borrower 
default probability (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005), which, in turn, can positively affect 
banks’ profits. Existing empirical evidence shows that the relaxation of regulatory 
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restrictions on banking competition in the United States substantially decreased credit 
losses in banks’ lending portfolios ( ayaratne and Strahan, 1996 and 1998; Dick and 
Lehnert, 2010). Researchers argue that competition generates an incentive for banks 
to adopt more sophisticated technology to measure credit risk. These technologies 
allow banks to assess credit risk more precisely and, consequently, the credit quality 
of banks’ lending portfolios in competitive banking systems improves. Therefore, 
banking competition has two contemporaneous effects on bank profitability: on the 
one hand, it weakens banks’ market power in setting loan rates, negatively affecting 
bank profitability. On the other hand, competition improves banks’ technological 
ability to assess credit risk and decreases credit losses, which has a positive effect on 
bank profitability. These opposing forces driving bank performance make the link 
between bank profitability and banking competition ambiguous. To shed more light 
on this relationship, it is important to understand the variables that moderate this link 
and cause the credit losses effect to prevail over the market power effect.    
In spite of an extensive literature on banking competition (Black and Strahan, 
2002; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2009), no papers have analyzed 
whether high expectations for future economic success or, more briefly, high 
economic optimism, influence the relation between banking competition and bank 
performance. This is surprising since high economic optimism may naturally lead to 
credit expansion, affecting both interest revenues from loans and credit losses. 
Specifically, high expectations for future economic success may decrease the 
expected default rate among borrowers, increasing the credit supply. Prior research 
has shown that banks in more competitive banking systems develop sophisticated 
technologies to measure credit risk. These technologies improve the banks’ ability to 
assess credit risk and might be particularly valuable in periods of credit expansion, 
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such as periods of high economic optimism. A natural question then arises: Does 
optimism moderate the effect of competition on the profitability of banks? I find that 
economic optimism does indeed influence the effect of competition on the 
profitability of banks. In periods of low optimism, competition decreases bank 
profitability, lowering a bank’s market power. However, an increase in the level of 
optimism in the economy weakens the negative effect of competition on bank 
performance. I show that an increase in the level of optimism in the economy is 
associated with an increase in credit losses in protected banking systems. However, in 
banking systems fully open to competition, an increase in economic optimism does 
not increase credit losses. When the level of optimism in the economy is high (the 
optimism measure is in its 75
th
 percentile), the increase in credit losses in protected 
credit markets is strong enough to cancel out the positive effect of market power on 
bank profitability. Overall, my results show that banks operating in more competitive 
environments are more able to identify credit risk in periods of high optimism. 
Moreover, my results indicate that as the level of optimism in the economy increases, 
the positive effect of market power on bank profitability vanishes. 
A key problem in analyzing the effect of optimism on the relationship between 
banking competition and bank performance is finding a measure for competition that 
is not connected to bank characteristics. Following Rice and Strahan (2010), I use 
entry barriers erected by states after the approval of the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994. Specifically, as outlined in Johnson and 
Rice (2008), IBBEA leaves to the states the power to limit banking competition, 
giving them the ability to erect four types of barriers to out-of-state entries. Because 
states repeatedly changed these entry barriers between 1994 and 2005, I use the entry 
barrier changes to approximate exogenous shocks to banking competition, exploiting 
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their unique ability to generate changes in loan supply without affecting the credit 
demand (Rice and Strahan, 2010). I then investigate whether the level of optimism in 
the economy moderates the relationship between banking competition and bank 
performance. As a measure of the level of optimism in the economy, I use the 
Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI), an indicator designed to measure the degree of 
optimism in the US economy that is updated monthly by the University of Michigan. 
As a robustness check, I also calculate a second measure for the level of optimism in 
the economy, the percentage of CEOs (of firms listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE)) who do not exercise stock options that are more than 67%
6
 in the 
money for each year of my sample. This indicator is based on the assumption that 
CEOs do not exercise such stock options if they have high expectations about future 
economic success (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). I use both measures of optimism at 
the (census) regional level. Then, I interact the level of optimism with the regulatory 
entry barriers to test whether economic confidence moderates the effect of regulatory 
entry barriers on bank performance. 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically analyze how 
optimism moderates the link between competition and bank performance. My 
findings are consistent with the theoretical results of Ruckes (2004) in showing that 
improving economic conditions significantly interact with banking competition in 
setting the quality of banks’ lending portfolios. The effect of this interaction is 
particularly important because lowering the quality of banks’ lending portfolios in 
periods of economic growth can engender a financial crisis when the economy takes a 
downturn (Dell’Ariccia and Márquez, 2006). My evidence is also consistent with the 
prediction of the Coval and Thakor (2005) model, which shows that banks can profit 
                                                        
6 This threshold is consistent with the financial economic literature on optimism (e.g., Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008). 
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from a high level of optimism in the economy by funding optimistic borrowers that 
would not otherwise be financed by investors. Specifically, the authors outline that 
the dimension and the importance of the banking system in an economy is positively 
associated with the level of optimism as long as banks can correctly evaluate the 
borrower’s default probability. In their framework, when optimism increases, the 
probability that an entrepreneur gets financed by investors decreases since investors 
are generally pessimist about the future outcome of the entrepreneur’s project. As 
long as banks can correctly evaluate default probability of optimistic borrowers, they 
can profitably finance them. Therefore, banking systems increase in importance and 
in dimension when the level of optimism in the economy increases. This outcome is 
consistent with my evidence, which shows that banks with more sophisticated 
technology to assess credit risk perform better in periods of high economic optimism.    
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background on bank liberalization and describes the proxy for regulatory entry 
barriers. Section 3 discusses the literature and formulates the hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the sample, the measure of optimism in the economy and the exogeneity of 
regulatory entry barriers. Section 5 introduces the empirical strategy, and Section 6 
presents and discusses the results. Section 7 presents some robustness checks, and 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 US credit market liberalization and branch restriction 
I exploit differences in regulatory barriers to interstate branching in order to 
approximate exogenous shocks to banking competition. This section briefly reviews 
the recent history of US credit liberalization. In the 1970s, the large majority of states 
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were enforcing restrictions on interstate branching. Between 1970 and 1994, 38 states 
eased their restrictions on branching. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) demonstrate that 
the mechanics behind this state-level deregulation mirrored the political leverage of 
lobbies in the financial services sector. States that were under the thumb of well-
capitalized large banks were likely to remove branching limitations early on. 
The 1994 Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was the 
beginning of the full interstate banking system. Although IBBEA permitted 
nationwide branching, it gave states enough flexibility to govern its implementation. 
They were allowed to set measures to discourage entry. These obstacles to entry fell 
into four categories: 1) states were allowed to set a minimum age of the target 
institution before it could be acquired by out-of-state bank holdings; 2) IBBEA left 
the option to forbid new interstate branching; 3) each state can decide whether it 
would allow entry through the acquisition of a single branch or part of a target 
institution; and 4) each state can impose statewide deposit caps on branch 
acquisitions. 
IBBEA left each state free to adopt a minimum age requirement for acquisition. 
Specifically, each state could decide how long an institution was required to have 
been operating in the state before it could become the target of an interstate 
acquisition. However, the states could not set a minimum age provision of more than 
five years. For example, if a newly installed subsidiary office were established in a 
state with a minimum age provision of three years, a bank holding company that 
would like to consolidate the office to a branch would have to postpone the 
acquisition until the subsidiary had met the minimum age requirement of three years.  
IBBEA also states that de novo interstate branching is allowed only if a state 
explicitly “opts in.” Hence, a bank is allowed to establish a new interstate branch if 
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the legislation of a given state unequivocally says so. Permitting de novo branching 
substantially increases credit market competition by leaving banks free to locate their 
branches in more profitable markets. Therefore, disallowing this de novo branching 
requirement is equivalent to erecting an entry barrier, because an out-of-state bank 
could then only enter another state's market via an interstate whole-bank merger. 
Moreover, the IBBEA also gives states the ability to prevent out-of-state entry 
through the acquisition of a branch (or a number of branches). Again, IBBEA says 
that states have to explicitly opt-in to allow the possibility of entry by the acquisition 
of a single branch or a number of branches. 
The final entry barrier that can be erected in accordance with the IBBEA is a 30% 
limit on deposit concentration at a state level with regard to mergers that constitute 
the initial entry of a bank into a state. The act sets a ceiling of 30% on the amount of 
deposits in the state that can be held or controlled by any single bank or bank holding 
after an interstate acquisition that constitutes an initial entry. However, IBBEA also 
establishes that a state may loosen the concentration limitation to above 30% or set a 
deposit limit on an interstate bank merger transaction below 30%. The effect of this 
kind of measure is to discourage a bank from engaging in a larger interstate merger in 
the state. 
Table 1 gives a timeline of U.S. credit market liberalization and places my sample 
period in context. 
<<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>> 
 
3 Literature review and hypotheses 
 
The relationship among banking competition, bank risk, and bank performance has 
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been widely discussed in the banking research.
7
 Various theoretical models (Marcus, 
1984; Keeley, 1990) show that competition decreases bank charter values and 
worsens risk-taking incentives. Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) indicate that banking 
competition can also have the opposite effect of decreasing the risk in bank lending 
portfolios. The authors predict a negative relation between banking competition and 
the losses in bank lending portfolios. However, they also predict a decrease in bank 
revenues generated by higher banking competition; therefore, the relation between 
banking competition and bank performance remains ambiguous. Moreover, 
extensions of the Boyd and De Nicolò model allowing for imperfect correlation in 
loan defaults (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011) show 
how banking competition can either increase or decrease bank risk, depending on 
other factors and the intensity of competition. 
Hence, from a theoretical standpoint, the link between banking competition 
and bank performance can be either positive or negative, depending on the average 
lending rate and the ability of banks to assess credit risk. Various papers have tried to 
empirically test the relationship among banking competition, bank performance, and 
risk taking using different proxies for banking competition. The change in market 
contestability arising from banking liberalization has been widely used in the 
literature as a measure of competition. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) document that 
the liberalization of the US credit market boosted economic growth. The authors 
argue that economic growth arises from the improved lending technologies of banks, 
which enhance their ability to assess credit risk. Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli 
and Strahan (2006), and Kerr and Nanda (2009) find that banking competition 
generates a substantial increase in credit supply, allowing previously excluded 
                                                        
7 See Degryse and Ongena (2008) for an extensive literature review. 
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borrowers to enter the credit market. Dick and Lehnert (2010) show that the increase 
in loan supply generated by credit market liberalization was also associated with 
lower losses in bank lending portfolios, indicating that bank lending technology 
improved after the credit market liberalization. Since the banks report profit net of the 
losses on their lending portfolios, credit liberalization may have a direct positive 
effect on bank profitability. However, banking competition also decreases the market 
power of banks in setting loan rates (Rice and Strahan, 2010), which decreases bank 
revenues. The final effect on profitability is, therefore, not clear. Specifically, 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that banking competition has two 
contemporaneous effects on bank profitability. On the one hand, it decreases bank 
revenues and bank market power in setting loan rates. On the other hand, competition 
reinforces the selection process among banks, leading those with better screening 
ability to increase their market shares. This selection process improves the quality of 
banks’ lending portfolios and decreases credit losses, such that the final effect on 
profitability is unclear. 
The existing empirical evidence then shows how the effect of competition on 
bank profitability crucially depends on credit supply and on the composition of banks’ 
lending portfolios. However, various theoretical papers argue that the composition of 
banks’ lending portfolios tend to deteriorate in periods of high economic success. 
Ruckes (2004) shows that improving economic conditions can lead to lax screening: 
the proportion of creditworthy borrowers increases in economic boom periods, 
making costly screening less desirable. Importantly, Ruckes calls attention to the 
valuable role of competition in keeping the quality of banks’ lending portfolios high 
in periods of economic growth. Dell’Ariccia and Márquez (2006) report a similar 
result, showing that the increase in credit demand in periods of economic growth can 
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lead banks to lower their lending standards in an attempt to acquire market shares. 
The authors also find that upswings in the economy can interact with competition in 
defining the composition of banks’ lending portfolios.  
 Upswings in the business cycle, generally anticipated by high expectations 
about future economic success (Beaudry and Portier 2006), can then interact with 
competition in defining the credit quality in banks’ lending portfolios. Allen and 
Saunders (2002) show that the borrower screening errors made by banks substantially 
correlate with the business cycle, since banks tend to underestimate borrowers’ 
default probabilities in periods of improving economic conditions. I posit that this 
phenomenon is more significant in protected banking systems. Therefore, in banking 
systems protected by geographical restriction to competition, I expect credit losses to 
be positively associated with economic optimism. Since competition incentivizes 
banks to develop sophisticated technology to assess borrowers’ credit quality, in 
competitive environments banks may be able to precisely measure credit risk, even in 
periods of high optimism.  
 
H1. As the level of optimism increases, the credit losses in banks’ lending 
portfolios in protected banking systems also increase.  
 
H1 states that in less competitive credit markets where regulatory restrictions 
to banking competition are higher, high economic optimism causes the losses in 
banks’ lending portfolios to increase. Because banks disclose their profit net of credit 
losses, this phenomenon has an immediate negative effect on bank profitability. 
Therefore, even if regulatory restrictions to competition provide banks with some 
market power in setting loan rates that increases bank profitability, I expect the 
positive effect of entry barriers on banks profits to decrease in periods of high 




H2. As the level of optimism in the economy increases, the positive relation 
between regulatory entry barriers and bank profitability decreases.  
 
4 Data and Variables for the Empirical Design 
 
I combine data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s commercial bank 
database with the state-level branching restriction index. The Federal Reserve 
database contains information on all commercial and savings banks that are regulated 
by the Federal Reserve System. I use reports of commercial banks from 1993 (i.e., the 
year before IBBEA passed) to 2006 (i.e., the year after the last documented change in 
regulatory entry barriers). Hence, the sample of banks contains reports from 1993 to 
2006, with a total of 105,073 observations.  
 
4.1 The branch restriction index 
 
The branch restriction index comes from Johnson and Rice (2008) and is 
reported in Table 2.  According to Rice and Strahan (2010), the index is set to 4 for all 
states before the first change in regulatory restrictions. Table 2 shows that the index 
changes at least once in all states during my sample period, and more than once for 15 
states. After the approval of IBBEA in 1994, all but 13 states imposed a minimum age 
for the target of an interstate acquisition, with an average minimum age of 4.7 years. 
Moreover, the majority of states (36) did not opt-in for de novo entry. Entry through 
the acquisition of only one branch or part of an institution was also forbidden in 30 
60 
states after passage of IBBEA, and 35 states imposed a cap of 30% or higher on the 
amount of deposits in the state that can be held or controlled by any single bank or 
bank holding after an interstate acquisition that constitutes an initial entry. 
 
<< INSERT HERE TABLE 2>> 
 
 
4.2 Measuring the level of optimism in the economy 
 
I measure the level of optimism in the economy using CSI, an indicator designed to 
measure the degree of optimism in the US economy that is updated monthly by the 
University of Michigan. Specifically, the CSI is constructed using a survey of 500 
randomly chosen US households on a monthly basis. The survey asks five questions 
about current economic conditions, business conditions for the next year, employment 
conditions for the next five years, and family consumption for the next year.
8
 The 
randomly chosen households are then reinterviewed after six months. The rotating 
sample is normally compounded with 60% new consumers each month and 40% 
households interviewed for the second time. The CSI is not published at a state level. 
Hence, in order to have some cross-sectional variation, I use the regional CSI index, 
which aggregates consumer expectations at a census regional level.
9
 
 I also construct an optimism index by calculating the share of CEOs who are 
considered optimistic according to the options-based criterion of Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) among the total number of CEOs of firms listed in the NYSE and ranked 
                                                        
8  Details about the index construction and the text of the questions can be found at this link: 
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/fetchdoc.php?docid=24770  
9 Information about the CSI and the sample used in its construction can be found at the following link: 
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu  
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in Execucomp. This measure of optimism is based on the idea that it is optimal for 
risk-averse undiversified executives to exercise their own firm’s stock option early if 
the option is sufficiently in the money (Hall and Murphy, 2002). In line with 
Malmendier and Tate (2008), Campbell et al. (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), and 
Galasso and Simcoe (2011), I define as optimists those managers who postpone the 
exercise of options that are at least 67% in the money. 
Specifically, for each CEO, I calculate the total realizable value per option by 
dividing the total realizable value of the exercisable options by the total number of 
options held by the CEO. The average strike price of the options is calculated as the 
fiscal year-end stock price minus the average realizable value. The average 
moneyness of the option is then obtained as the fiscal year stock price divided by the 
average strike price minus one. If the moneyness of the option is above 67%, I 
categorize the CEO n in that year t as an optimist. I use only CEOs of enterprises 
listed on the NYSE. In order to be consistent with the CSI measure, I construct this 
index at the (census) regional level. The CSI and the ratio of optimistic CEOs to the 
total number of CEOs of firms listed in NYSE at the regional level after the 
introduction of IBBEA are reported in Table 3. Figure 1 also reports trend data on the 
CSI and the ratio of optimistic CEOs. 
<<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE>> 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE>> 
 
4.3 Other variables 
 
I complement my bank sample with control variables at the state level, 
augmenting the econometric models with personal income growth from the Bureau of 
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Economic Analysis. To account for potential differences among banks in the sample, 
I also include bank-level control variables. Specifically, I control for bank size (the 
natural logarithm of bank total assets), the bank income diversification (the share of 
non-interest income in operating income), the interest on deposit on total interest 
expenses (interest on deposits on interest expenses), and bank capitalization (total 
equity on total assets). 
In accordance with Dick and Lehnert (2010), as an additional control for 
market structure, I include the market share of small banks (banks with less than $100 
million in assets) in each state and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index. All of the control 
variables are winsorized at 1%, centered on their mean, and divided by their standard 
deviation. Table 4 defines the variables used in my analysis, and Table 5 reports the 
summary statistics for all the variables. 
 
<< INSERT HERE TABLES 4 AND 5>> 
 
The average reported return on assets (ROA) in Table 5 is roughly 1%. The 
branch restriction index, my policy variable, has a mean of 2.81 and a standard 
deviation of 1.42. Note that the branch restriction index changes more than once for 
several states. This feature is particularly important because, as outlined in Bertrand et 
al. (2004), repeated variations in the policy over time may reduce the autocorrelation 
issues. The Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) has a mean of 95.48 in my sample with 
a standard deviation of 7.35, The measure of optimism, calculated based on the 
exercising of stock options by CEOs of firms listed on the NYSE, has a mean of 
32.70% and a standard deviation of 7.94%. 
<< INSERT HERE TABLES 6>> 
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Table 6 also reports the correlation between the control variables used in the 
estimation. As expected, the optimism measures are positively correlated each other. 
However, the correlation between the CSI and the index calculated using the 
exercising of stock options by CEO of firms listed on the NYSE is only 34%. This 
low correlation between the optimism measures underscores the distinct natures of the 
two indexes, which differ in two important ways. First, the University of Michigan 
randomly selects the sample of consumers underlying the Consumer Sentiment Index, 
and it also picks up signals from less industrialized regions of the country. The sample 
underlying the measure of optimism based on the CEO of firms listed in the NYSE is 
not random and is affected by the geographical clusterization of such firms. Second, 
the CSI comes from consumer answers to surveys, whereas the index calculated on 
the exercising of stock options comes from the decisions made by CEOs of firms 
listed on the NYSE. The ability to analyze the signals of the economy can vary 
substantially between these two groups. As expected, both optimism variables are 
positively correlated with personal income growth. Again, this correlation is not very 
high, measuring 0.34 and 0.41 for the interactions between personal income and, 
respectively, CSI and the NYSE CEOs index. 
 
 
4.4 The Exogeneity of interstate branch restrictions 
One concern with using regulatory entry barriers as a policy instrument for banking 
competition is possible endogeneity of the regulation. As outlined by Rice and 
Strahan (2010), regulatory entry barriers can, in fact, reflect political pressure 
generated by interest groups. If states with specific characteristics are more likely to 
64 
deregulate, then the branch index could be correlated with these unobserved state 
characteristics; thus, its influence on bank performance might reflect not only banking 
competition but also the effect of unobserved state characteristics. For instance, if 
states with higher expectations about future economic success are more likely to 
remove entry barriers, then my branch index could be correlated with credit demand 
and with the measures of optimism. Rice and Strahan (2010) show that regulatory 
entry barriers are, in fact, correlated with income growth and with the percentage of 
banks that have less than $100 million in total assets (small banks). However, they 
argue that because the differences among states are very persistent over time, this 
correlation can be ignored by including state fixed effects in the regression models.  
 Table 7 presents the results from a regression in which I aggregate my data at 
the state level and then test whether the state characteristics correlate with changes in 
the branch restriction index after the introduction of state fixed effects and time 
dummies. In Table 7, I also test whether the level of optimism in the economy is 
correlated with the regulatory entry barriers after I partial out state and year fixed 
effects. None of the regression coefficients of personal income, the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index, the market share of small banks (banks with total assets below $100 
million), the CSI, and the measure of optimism calculated on the option exercising of 
CEOs has a significant impact on the bank restriction index after controlling for state 
and year fixed effects.  
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To test my research hypotheses, I estimate the following equation:  
                                                                      
                                              
                                              
The policy variable (                    ) is a count variable ranging from 0 to 4; this 
feature of the branch restriction index allows me to evaluate the effects of competition 
at various levels. The optimism variable              varies at a regional-year level 
(for k equal to northeast or north central or south or west). For ease of interpretation 
of the estimated coefficients, the variable optimism is centered on the minimum and 
divided by its standard deviation. This adjustment allows me to interpret the 
coefficient    as the effect of entry barriers on the outcome variable      when the 
level of optimism is at its minimum as well as the coefficient    as the effect of a one 
standard deviation increase in optimism on   . Put differently,    indicates how the 
effect of entry barriers on the outcome variables changes with the level of optimism in 
the economy. Therefore equation (1) enables me to identify the effect that the level of 
optimism in the economy has on the relation between banking competition and the 
outcome variable. In all the estimated regression models, I cluster standard errors at 
the state level (Bertrand et al., 2004).  
 
 
6 Results  
6.1 The growth of charge-off in banks’ lending portfolios 
Table 8 reports results for the estimations of equation (1) in which the dependent 
variable is the growth of loan charge-offs. The first two models are augmented with 
state fixed effects, the fourth and the fifth models use bank fixed effects. In all of the 
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regression models, I cluster standard errors at the state level. For ease interpretation of 
the estimated coefficients, the variable CSI is centered on its minimum and divided by 
its standard deviation.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 8 HERE>> 
 
The independent variables in Models 1 and 3 are the branch restriction index 
and its interaction with the level of optimism in the economy. In Models 2 and 4, I use 
states, banks, and banking market structure controls centered on their means, divided 
by their standard deviations and winsorized at the 1% level. In all models, I use time 
fixed effects, and I cluster standard errors at the state level.  
Table 8 shows that adding a regulatory barrier to banking competition when 
the level of optimism in the economy is at its minimum decreases the growth of loan 
charge-offs.  The coefficient on the variable branch restriction is negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.05) in all of the regression models. The interaction 
coefficient of the branch restriction index and the CSI is positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01) in all models. This evidence confirms my first hypothesis that as 
the level of optimism increases, the credit losses in banks’ lending portfolios in 
protected banking systems increase. 
Specifically, in periods of moderated optimism, approximated by the value of 
      in its 25
th
 percentile, an additional entry barrier to banking competition 
decreases the charge-off growth by 5.53%.
10
 Using the sample average of the charge 
off growth (2.17) as a benchmark, this represents a decrease of 2.55%. However, 
                                                        
10 This is calculated as -0.10398+0.05595*0.8698, where -0.10398 is the coefficient in the first model 
on the branch restriction index; 0.05595 is the coefficient of the interaction between the branch 
restriction index and CSI; and 0.82 is the number of CSI standard deviations (7.358) needed to pass 
from the minimum (83.6) to the value of CSI at its 25th percentile (90). 
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when the level of optimism is in the 75
th
 percentile, adding a regulatory restriction to 
out-of-state entry increases the growth of charge-offs by 5.11%. Using the average 
growth of charge-offs in my sample, this represents an increase of 2.36%. These 
estimates are consistent with H1 in showing that the level of optimism increases the 
link between entry barriers and the charge-off growth in protected banking systems. 
This result indicates that restricting banking competition through regulatory entry 
barriers in periods of high optimism leads the credit losses in bank lending portfolios 
to increase faster. Importantly, the coefficient on the regional CSI is positive but not 
statistically significant in all of the estimated models. This result indicates that a 
standard deviation increase in the level of optimism in the economy does not generate 
an increase in charge-off growth in markets fully open to banking competition, such 
as those banking systems without any branch restriction. 
I show that the above relationship is also confirmed when I introduce bank, 
state, and banking market structure controls into the analysis. The coefficient on the 
branch restriction index and its interaction with the level of optimism in the economy 
are similar in their dimension and in their statistical significance with state or bank 
fixed effects (Models 3 and 4). Specifically focusing Model 3, which is augmented by 
bank fixed effects, an additional barrier to out-of-state entry decreases the average 
charge-off growth in my sample by 3.67% when the level of optimism is in the 25
th
 
percentile. Using the sample average of charge-off growth as a benchmark, this 
represents a decrease of 1.69%. However, when the level of optimism is in the 75
th
 
percentile, an additional barrier to out-of-state entry increases the sample average of 
charge-off growth by 2.44%.  
Model 4 in Table 8 also shows that a standard deviation increase in state 
personal income decreases the growth of charge offs. Interestingly, in Model 4, a 
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standard deviation increase in bank size, approximated by the natural logarithm of 
banks’ total assets, seems to also decrease the growth of charge-offs. This result 
suggests that larger banks might be more capable of assessing credit risk. Model 4 
also shows that higher capitalization is positively associated with higher credit loss 
growth, suggesting that banks may increase their capitalization to lend to riskier 
borrowers. 
The reported results confirm my first hypothesis by showing that in periods of 
high optimism, credit losses increase in protected banking systems. The increase in 
credit losses may be detrimental for banking profits.
11
 Therefore any positive effect 
that branch restriction might have on bank profitability is expected to be less 
pronounced in periods of high economic optimism. In the next section, I look more 
closely at bank profitability. 
 
6.2 Bank performance 
Table 9 reports results for the estimations of equation (1) in which the dependent 
variable is the return on assets (ROA), calculated as the net income on total assets. 
The first two models are augmented with state fixed effects, and the third and fourth 
models use bank fixed effects.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE>> 
                                                        
11 Since banks disclose their profits net of credit losses, an increase in loan charge-offs is detrimental 
to banks’ profitability. However, in protected credit environments, banks can also provide loans at 
higher lending rates in periods of high optimism. Hence, the increase in credit losses might be 
accompanied by an equal or even greater increase in interest revenues from loans. If this is the case, the 
final effect on banks’ profits will remain unidentifiable. In Section 6.2, I show that this is not the case. 
Moreover, in unreported results, I adjust the growth of credit losses in different ways to take into 
account the market power effect. Specifically, I estimate equation (1) using as the dependent variable 
the ratio of the charge-off growth on the interest revenue growth, and I calculate the difference in the 
logarithmic growth rate of loan charge-off and interest and fee revenues from loans. Regardless of the 
adjustment used, the results remain qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to the results estimated 
using the growth of charge-offs. 
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Models 1 and 3 show ROA results using as regressors only the branch 
restriction and its interaction with the level of optimism, but in Models 2 and 4, I use 
banks, market structure, and bank controls centered on their meana, divided by their 
standard deviations, and winsorized at the 1% level.  In all models, I use time fixed 
effects. The estimated coefficient shows that an additional barrier to out-of-state entry 
increases bank profitability when the level of optimism is at its minimum. In all 
models, the coefficient on the branch restriction index is positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01). The coefficient on the interaction between the branch restriction 
index and the level of optimism is negative and significant (p<0.01) in all of the 
models. This evidence is consistent with H2, showing that the level of optimism in the 
economy substantially decreases the positive effect of regulatory restriction to 
banking competition on bank performance. Moreover, Models 2 and 4 show that this 
result does not change if I use bank or state fixed effects and if I augment the 
regression models with some control variables. This evidence is consistent with the 
results of the previous section that in protected credit markets, when optimism 
increases, credit losses also increase. The increase in credit losses is detrimental to 
bank profitability. The reported results show that any positive effect that regulatory 
restrictions to banking competition have on ban’ profitability is wiped out by an 
increase in the level of optimism in the economy.  
 Model 1 shows that in periods of low economic confidence, in the 25
th
 
percentile of the variable CSI, an additional barrier to out-of-state entry increases 
ROA by 0.020%. Using the average ROA in my sample as a benchmark, this 
represents an approximate increase of 1.828%. If banking competition is extremely 
limited (four entry barriers), in periods of low optimism, the increase in average bank 
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performance is 7.314%. In periods of high optimism (the value of CSI in the 75
th 
percentile), the effect of an additional barrier to out-of-state entry becomes negative, 
namely -0.005%, representing -0.468% of the average ROA. This relation shows that 
a protectionist policy in terms of banking competition (with four entry barriers) in 
periods of high optimism generates a decrease in average bank performance of 
1.872%.  
Models 3 and 4 show estimates of the branch restriction index and its 
interaction with the level of optimism in the economy using bank fixed effects and 
adding states, banks, and banking market structure controls. I find a negative and 
significant (p<0.01) coefficient on the interaction term between the branch restriction 
index and the level of optimism in the economy; this effect remains highly significant 
irrespective of the introduction of control variables.  
My findings are consistent with H2: the level of optimism in the economy 
substantially decreases the link between regulatory restrictions to credit markets and 
bank profitability. Table 9 also indicates that an increase in personal income at the 
state level increases bank profitability. Surprisingly, Model 2 shows a negative link 
between the concentration of the banking system and bank profitability. However, this 
effect is not strongly statistically significant (p<0.10) and becomes statistically 
indistinguishable than zero when I use bank fixed effects. The reported results also 
suggest that small banks are less profitable than larger banks. In addition, more 
capitalized banks seem to report higher performance; however, when bank fixed 
effects are introduced into the model, this effect loses its statistical significance. 
 
7 Robustness checks 
I obtain similar results to those reported in Table 8 and 9 when I replace the CSI with 
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the ratio of CEOs that can be ranked as optimist according to the criterion of 
Malmendier and Tate (2008). As outlined in session 4.2, the sample underlying the 
two measures for the level of optimism in the economy is very different. The CSI is 
calculated on a random sample of consumers, while the NYSE CEOs measure comes 
from the decisions made by CEOs of firms listed on the NYSE. As shown in Table 6, 
the correlation between the two measures of optimism is only 34.5%.  Moreover, it is 
also important to stress that the NYSE CEOs measure is affected by some regions 
having higher industrialization.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 10 HERE>> 
 
 Table 10 reports the results from models similar to those in Tables 8 and 9, 
where I use the same dependent variables but with the CSI as the measure of 
optimism. The results on ROA and on the charge off growth are qualitatively very 
similar to those reported in Tables 8 and 9. Specifically Models 1 and 2 show that 
adding an entry barrier to banking competition increases banking profits when the 
level of optimism is at its minimum. This result is not affected if I augment the 
regression model with control variables. Moreover, the interaction between the branch 
restriction index and the measure of optimism based on CEO option-exercising is 
positive and statistically significant (p<0.1). This result confirms H2, indicating that 
the level of optimism in the economy weakens the positive link between the 
profitability of banks and the branch restriction index. Importantly, the results 
reported in Table 10 suggest that the profitability of banks operating in banking 
systems fully open to banking competition is positively associated with the level of 
optimism in the economy. Using the NYSE CEOs measure of optimism, this relation 
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becomes highly significant (p<0.01). This association also remains statistically 
significant when we look at the growth of charge-offs. The results reported in Table 
10 suggest that credit losses in banks’ lending portfolios decrease when the level of 
optimism increases. Model 3 and 4 confirm H1 in showing that in periods of high 
optimism credit losses increase in protected banking systems.  
 
8 Conclusions 
The relation among banking competition, bank profitability, and risk-taking is a 
central topic in banking research. The literature shows that an increase in competition 
arising from the liberalization of interstate branching improves banks’ ability to 
screen borrowers and decreases credit losses in banks’ lending portfolios (Dick and 
Lehnert, 2010). Improved lending in more competitive credit markets can attenuate 
the general tendency of banks to produce overly optimistic estimates of credit risk in 
periods of improving economic conditions (Allen and Saunders, 2002). Therefore, 
limiting competition through regulatory entry barriers can have opposing effects on 
bank profitability. Limiting competition can provide banks with some market power 
that increases bank profitability. In contrast, it can also decrease the banks’ ability to 
assess credit risk, with a detrimental effect on the performance of banks.  
 In this paper, I use the regulatory restrictions to banking competition 
introduced by each state after the 1994 passage of IBBEA to approximate exogenous 
shocks to banking competition. I argue that the level of optimism in the economy 
decreases the positive relation between restricted competition and bank profitability. I 
show that the introduction of regulatory entry barriers to banking competition in 
periods of high optimism leads the credit losses in banks’ lending portfolios to 
increase. Therefore, even if entry barriers to banking competition provide banks with 
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some monopoly rents that increase bank profitability, the positive effect of market 
power on bank performance decreases when the level of optimism in the economy 
increases.  
These results have important policy implications. Increasing the competition 
in banking markets through liberalization policies can be particularly useful when the 
level of optimism in the economy is very high. This empirical result is consistent with 
the prediction of the Ruckes’ (2004) theoretical model: in periods of improving 
economic conditions, when the borrower default probability is expected to decrease, 
the credit quality in the portfolios of banks operating in protected environments tends 
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CSI NYSE CEOs options
Figure 1: 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the portion of CEOs in the NYSE who do not 
exercise option more than 67% in the money 
This figure reports the evolution of optimism by region in the US after the approval of 
IBBEA. The blue dotted line is the CSI optimism index based on the University of 
Michigan survey, and the red line is the index based on the exercise of CEO stock options. 
 






















Timeline of US credit market liberalization and my sample of banks 

























































State and Interstate Branching Laws 
This table reports the interstate branching restriction index, the date of the regulation changes, and the specific 
requirements imposed by each state in regard to a minimum age for branch acquisition,  de novo interstate 
branching,  interstate branching by acquisition of a single branch or a portion of an institution, and a statewide 




Index Effective Date 
Minimum Age 
of a Bank or a 
Branch for 
Acquisition 





Acquisition of a 
Single Branch or 






Alabama 3 May 31, 1997 5 No No 30% 
Alaska 2 January 1, 1994 3 No Yes 50% 
Arizona 3 
September 1, 
1996 5 No No 30% 
Arizona 2 
August 31, 
2001 5 No Yes 30% 
Arkansas 4 June 1, 1997 5 No No 25% 
California 3 
September 28, 
1995 5 No No 30% 
Colorado 4 June 1, 1997 5 No No 25% 
Connecticut 1 June 27, 1995 5 Yes Yes 30% 
Delaware 3 
September 29, 
1995 5 No No 30% 
District of 
Columbia 0 June 13, 1996 No Yes Yes 30% 
Florida 3 June 1, 1997 3 No No 30% 
Georgia 3 June 1, 1997 5 No No 30% 
Georgia 3 May 10, 2002 3 No No 30% 
Hawaii 3 June 1, 1997 5 No No 30% 
Hawaii 0 January 1, 2001 No Yes Yes 30% 
Idaho 3 
September 29, 
1995 5 No No None 
Illinois 3 June 1, 1997 5 No No 30% 
Illinois 0 
August 20, 
2004 No Yes Yes 30% 
Indiana 0 June 1, 1997 No Yes Yes 30% 
Indiana 1 July 1, 1998 5 Yes Yes 30% 
Iowa 4 April 4, 1996 5 No No 15% 
Kansas 4 
September 29, 
1995 5 No No 15% 
Kentucky 4 June 1, 1997 5 No No 15% 
Kentucky 3 March 17, 2000 No No No 15% 
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Index Effective Date 
Minimum Age 
of a Bank or a 
Branch for 
Acquisition 





Acquisition of a 
Single Branch or 






Louisiana 3 June 1, 1997 5 No No 30% 
Maine 0 January 1, 1997 No Yes Yes 30% 
Maryland 0 
September 29, 
1995 No Yes Yes 30% 
Massachusetts 1 August 2, 1996 3 Yes Yes 30% 
Michigan 0 
November 29, 
1995 No Yes Yes None 
Minnesota 3 June 1, 1997 5 No No 30% 
Mississippi 4 June 1, 1997 5 No No 25% 
Missouri 4 
September 29, 
1995 5 No No 13% 
Montana 4 
September 29, 
1995 N/A N/A N/A 1%peery 
Montana 4 
October 1, 
2001 5 No No 22% 
Nebraska 4 May 31, 1997 5 No No 14% 
Nevada 3 
September 29, 
1995 5 Limited Limited 30% 
New Hampshire 4 June 1, 1997 5 No No 20% 
New Hampshire 1 August 1, 2000 5 Yes Yes 30% 
New Hampshire 0 January 1, 2002 No Yes Yes 30% 
New Jersey 1 April 17, 1996 No No Yes 30% 
New Mexico 3 June 1, 1996 5 No No 40% 
New York 2 June 1, 1997 5 No Yes 30% 
North Carolina 0 July 1, 1995 No Yes Yes 30% 
North Dakota 3 May 31, 1997 No No No 25% 
North Dakota 1 August 1, 2003 No Yes Yes 25% 
Ohio 0 May 21, 1997 No Yes Yes 30% 
Oklahoma 4 May 31, 1997 5 No No 15% 
Oklahoma 1 May 17, 2000 No Yes Yes 20% 
Oregon 3 July 1, 1997 3 No No 30% 
Pennsylvania 0 July 6, 1995 No Yes Yes 30% 
Rhode Island 0 June 20, 1995 No Yes Yes 30% 
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South Carolina 3 July 1, 1996 5 No No 30% 




Index Effective Date 
Minimum Age 
of a Bank or a 
Branch for 
Acquisition 





Acquisition of a 
Single Branch or 






Tennessee 3 June 1, 1997 5 No No 30% 
Tennessee 2 May 1, 1998 5 No Yes 30% 
Tennessee 1 July 1, 2001 5 Yes Yes 30% 
Tennessee 1 March 17, 2003 3 Yes Yes 30% 
Texas 4 
August 28, 
1995 N/A N/A N/A 20% 
Texas 2 
September 1, 
1999 No Yes Yes 20% 
Utah 2 June 1, 1995 5 No Yes 30% 
Utah 1 April 30, 2001 5 Yes Yes 30% 
Vermont 2 May 30, 1996 5 No Yes 30% 
Vermont 0 January 1, 2001 No Yes Yes 30% 
Virginia 0 
September 29, 
1995 No Yes Yes 30% 
Washington 3 June 6, 1996 5 No No 30% 
Washington 1 May 9, 2005 5 Yes Yes 30% 
West Virginia 1 May 31, 1997 No Yes Yes 25% 
Wisconsin 3 May 1, 1996 5 No No 30% 




















Measure of Optimism in the Economy 
This table reports the measure of optimism after the introduction of IBBEA. The 
Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) is reported by the University of Michigan. 
NYSE CEOs option is the ratio of the CEOs who do not exercise stock option 
that are more than 67% in the money on the total number of CEOs of firms 
listed on the NYSE and ranked in Execucomp. 
 CSI 
 
North East North Central South West 
1994 91.6 94.3 92.4 90 
1995 86.9 94.7 93.9 91.3 
1996 88.9 97.4 92.8 94.6 
1997 101.1 104 103.6 103.4 
1998 104.2 105.5 104.6 103.8 
1999 106 104.4 106.3 106.4 
2000 108.6 107.4 106.9 108.2 
2001 88.1 87.8 90.9 89 
2002 87.9 88.9 91.2 89.1 
2003 84.8 86.4 90.7 86.3 
2004 91.5 92.4 99.5 94.5 
2005 84.7 84.7 91.4 91.2 
2006 83.6 84.5 87.9 92.9 
 NYSE CEOs option  
 North East North Central South West 
1994 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.30 
1995 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.27 
1996 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.28 
1997 0.48 0.41 0.39 0.22 
1998 0.52 0.44 0.49 0.29 
1999 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.26 
2000 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.17 
2001 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.20 
2002 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.16 
2003 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.14 
2004 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.19 
2005 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.22 
2006 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.26 
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Variable Description Database 
Return on Asset (ROA) The ratio of net income on total asset the 
(riad4340/ rcfd2170) 
Call Reports 
Charge off on growth  The growth of loan charge off is constructed as 
the loan charge off (riad4635) at time t divided by 
the loan charge off at time t-1  
Call Reports 
Branch restriction index The changes in the branch restriction index Rice and Strahan 
(2010) 
CSI  The consumer sentiment index (CSI) measures 
the level of optimism in the US economy using 
the answers of US households selected randomly 




NYSE CEOs option The share of executives leading firms listed in the 
NYSE who did not exercise stock option that are 
more than 67% in the money 
Execucomp 
State personal income growth The growth of personal income at the state level NBER database 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index The market concentration index at the state level, 
calculated as the sum of the banks squared 
market shares in terms of total asset at the state 
level 
Call Reports 
Small bank share The state share of small banks (less than 100M $ 
of total asset) 
Call Reports 
Log (total assets) The natural logarithm of total assets (rcfd2170) Call Reports 
The share of non-interest income in 
operating income 
A measure of income diversification (variables 
riad4079/ riad4000) 
Call Reports 
Interest on deposits on interest expenses This variable is the share of interest paid on 
deposits on total interest expenses (riad4170/ 
riad4073)  
Call Reports 
Equity on Total Assets This variable is the banks’ capitalization 












ROA 105,073 0.0108 0.0067 -0.0405 0.0331 
Charge off growth 105,073 2.1702 4.2737 0.0000 31.6000 
Branch restriction index 105,073 2.8080 1.4176 0.0000 4.0000 
Consumer Sentiment Index 105,073 95.4783 7.3580 83.6000 108.6000 
NYSE CEOs index 105,073 0.3270 0.0794 0.1440 0.5156 
State personal income growth 105,073 1.0460 0.0188 0.9536 1.0931 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index 105,073 0.1108 0.1007 0.0074 0.9096 
Small bank share 105,073 0.0054 0.0299 0.0000 0.9590 
Log (total assets) 105,073 11.5571 1.2656 8.9229 15.9424 
Non-interest income on operating income 105,073 0.1079 0.0764 0.0067 0.6002 
Interest on deposits on interest expenses 105,068 0.9100 0.1461 0.1915 1.0000 


























































































































































































Branch restriction index           
Consumer Sentiment Index 0.034          
NYSE CEOs index 0.133 0.345         
State personal income growth 0.041 0.346 0.410        
Herfindahl–Hirschman index -0.307 -0.070 -0.190 -0.089       
Small bank share -0.064 -0.011 -0.050 -0.012 0.110      
Log (total assets) -0.252 -0.083 -0.106 -0.040 0.183 0.424     
Non-interest income on operating income -0.038 -0.092 -0.127 -0.067 0.078 0.207 0.273    
Interest on deposits on interest expenses 0.096 0.107 0.043 0.011 -0.074 -0.176 -0.406 -0.196   

































The exogeneity of the branch restriction index 
This table reports the coefficient on a regression model where I use the branch restriction index as a dependent 
variable to test any residual correlation between the policy variable, my measure of optimism, and some state 
characteristics after partialling-out state and year fixed effects. Specifically, the Herfindahl–Hirschman index 
(HHI) and the share of banks with less than $100 million in total assets (small bank share) are calculated by 
aggregating my data at the state level. Personal income is also at the state level and comes from the NBER 
database. The CSI and the NYSE CEO are at the regional level.  
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-1.0574   
 
  
(0.7325)   




   
(1.8647)  
          0.0103 
    (0.0233)  
                 -1.0430 
     (1.5659) 
         5.0662* 3.8712*** 3.6763*** 2.7095 3.8801*** 
 
(2.7545) (0.2724) (0.2102) (1.9006) (0.5324) 
         Y Y Y Y Y 
        Y Y Y Y Y 
            663 663 663 663 663 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level 





















The Growth of Loans Charge Off  
 
This table presents the results for the estimation of the following equation: 
                  
                    
                                                                     
                                       
The growth of charge-offs is calculated as the value of the variable at time t divided by the value 
of the same variable at time t-1. In the first two models, I include state fixed effects, but in the 
third and fourth models I use bank fixed effects. Time dummies are also added into all models. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The state, banking market structure, and bank 
controls are centered on their means, divided by their standard deviations, and winsorized at the 
1% level. For an easier interpretation of the parameters of interest, the variable CSI is centered on 
its minimum and divided by its standard deviation. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
                  
                    
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                       -0.10398*** -0.10023*** -0.07762** -0.08611*** 
 
(0.03441) (0.03143) (0.03222) (0.03211) 
        0.01108 0.08731 -0.07369 0.02956 
 (0.08635) (0.08066) (0.07650) (0.07787) 
                               0.05595*** 0.05384*** 0.04710*** 0.04931*** 
 
(0.01440) (0.01355) (0.01346) (0.01336) 




































                        










                     










            










         2.01776*** 1.92467*** 2.06722*** 1.88520*** 
 
(0.14132) (0.12789) (0.12987) (0.13415) 
     
             105,073 105,073 105,073 105,073 
                   Y Y Y Y 
                    Y Y N N 
                   N N Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




Regression on Bank Performance 
 
This table presents the results for the estimation of the following equation: 
 
                                                                          
                                       
 
The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA).  In the first two models, I include state fixed 
effects, but in the third and fourth models I use bank fixed effects. Time dummies are also added 
into all models. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The state, banking market structure, 
and bank controls are centered on their means, divided by their standard deviations, and winsorized 
at the 1% level. For an easier interpretation of the parameters of interest, the variable CSI is 
centered on its minimum and divided by its standard deviation. 
 Dependent Variable:        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                       0.00031*** 0.00026*** 0.00026*** 0.00025*** 
 
(0.00010) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00008) 
        0.00058* 0.00021 0.00060* 0.00033 
 (0.00034) (0.00027) (0.00030) (0.00025) 
                               -0.00013*** -0.00010*** -0.00010*** -0.00010*** 
 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) 




























                        









                     









           









         0.00936*** 0.01051*** 0.00952*** 0.01012*** 
 
(0.00061) (0.00046) (0.00052) (0.00041) 
 
  
               105,073 105,073 105,073 105,073 
                   Y Y Y Y 
                    Y Y N N 
                   N N Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level 






This table presents the results for the estimation of the following equation: 
                                                                                  
                                       
The dependent variable      is the return on assets (ROA) in the first two models and the 
growth of charge-offs in Models 3 and 4. In all models, I include state fixed effects and time 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The state, banking market structure, 
and bank controls are standardized and winsorized at the 1% level. For an easier 
interpretation of the parameters of interest, the variable           is centered on its 
minimum and divided by its standard deviation. 
 Dependent Variable:        
Dependent Variable: 
                  
                    
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                       0.00019* 0.00018* -0.08560** -0.09573** 
 
(0.00011) (0.00010) (0.03733) (0.03617) 
             0.00085*** 0.00075*** -0.16534** -0.15550** 
 (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.07456) (0.07342) 
                      
              -0.00006* -0.00007** 0.04298*** 0.04701*** 
 
(0.00004) (0.00003) (0.01408) (0.01381) 
                     0.00029**  -0.07505*** 
 
 (0.00012)  (0.02263) 
         -0.00027*  0.03641 
 
 (0.00016)  (0.05115) 
                      -0.00027***  -0.00893 
 
 (0.00007)  (0.01233) 
              0.00176***  -0.21059*** 
 
 (0.00011)  (0.02389) 
                    
                     
 
 0.00033**  -0.14411*** 
 
 (0.00013)  (0.01824) 
                     
                      
 
 0.00015**  -0.04823** 
 
 (0.00006)  (0.01890) 
            
                
 
 0.00163***  0.06029** 
 
 (0.00012)  (0.02666) 




(0.00058) (0.00051) (0.27164) (0.26585) 
 
    
             105,073 105,073 105,073 105,073 
                   Y Y Y Y 
                    Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 







Abstract: Innovation is the main driver of economic growth. However, the 
determinants of firms’ ability to innovate are still widely discussed among 
academics and policymakers. In this paper, we posit that corporate culture 
plays a crucial role in the firms’ ability to innovate. Following the Competing 
Value Framework, we identify four different corporate cultures: competition-
oriented, control-oriented, creativity-oriented, and collaboration-oriented. We 
assume that the words and the language used by members of listed firms in 
their official documents reveal some information on the culture they develop 
over time. We then measure corporate culture, analysing the 10-K of listed 
firms. We show that firms with a creativity-oriented corporate culture invest 
more in R&D and obtain better results from their investment in innovation. 
This evidence suggests creativity-oriented firms are better innovators. 
Consistently with this finding, we also show that this corporate culture is 
associated with higher firm value.  
 






Innovation can be defined as the introduction of new goods, new methods of 
production, the establishment of new markets, or new forms of supply. Innovation 
plays a key role in boosting economic growth (Aghion et al., 2013) and understanding 
the determinants of firms’ ability to innovate, has been the focus of academics and 
policymakers
12
 in the last few decades. Corporate culture can potentially catalyse 
firms’ innovation processes since it can boost employees’ motivation (Edmans, Li, 
and Zhang, 2014) and improve firms’ working environments (Price, 2007). The belief 
that corporate culture relates to the firms’ innovation ability is also widely held 
among listed firms: 85% of S&P 500 companies have a section dedicated to corporate 
                                                        
12 See OECD (2007) 
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culture on their website, in which 80% of them advertise innovation as a corporate 
value (Guiso et al., 2014). Some examples are Intel, that in its web page dedicated to 
corporate culture states that “passion for innovation helps us maintain our role as a 
technology leader”, or 3M that defines W. McKnight, the company chairman from 
1949 to 1966 as “a business philosopher, since he created a corporate culture that 
encourages employee initiative and innovation”. There is a growing academic 
literature on corporate culture addressing important issues, such as the link between 
firm performance and the employees’ perception of corporate values (Guiso et al., 
2013), or the role played by corporate culture in moderating the probability of CEO 
turnover (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014). Surprisingly, no empirical papers that analyse 
the relationship between innovation and corporate culture exist. This paper aims to fill 
this gap by answering the following research questions: Does corporate culture 
influence firms’ investment in innovation? Is the higher investment in innovation 
reflected in firms’ valuation?  
We show that corporate culture plays an important role in firms’ propensity to 
undertake innovative projects. Specifically, we document three main results. First, we 
find that firms more oriented towards creativity (i.e. creativity-oriented), invest more 
in innovation. Second, we document that firms with a corporate culture geared 
towards implementing greater innovation investment generate higher innovative 
output even after controlling for R&D expenses. Third, we outline that the same 
corporate culture that increases investment in innovation and firms’ patenting activity 
is, also, positively associated to firm value. 
We measure corporate culture by assessing corporate financial statements and 
assume that words and language used by members of listed firms in their official 
documents (named “vocabulary”) reveal some information on the culture they adhere 
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to (Levinson, 2003). By using the competing values’ framework (CVF) (Cameron et 
al., 2006, and Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) to define four cultural dimensions (create, 
collaborate, compete, and control), we identify a set of words for each cultural 
dimension, and subsequently frame them by using the Harvard Psychological 
dictionary. We then run a text analysis (Stone et al., 1966) on the 128,489 10-K 
reports, which are available in the SEC's Edgar database to estimate a firm-year 
specific score for each corporate cultural dimension of the CVF.  
We approximate investment in innovation by R&D expenditure, and firms’ 
innovative output by their patenting activity, which is the number of patents applied 
for in each year of our sample from the U.S. Patents and Trademarks Office 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2012). We collect our firms’ number of patents and patent citations 
from the NBER patent database, which comprises 3.2 million patent grants and 23.6 
million patent citations. The latest release of the NBER patent database starts in 1976 
and ends in 2006. Since it takes approximately two years for a patent to be granted, 
and patents are included in the database only if they are eventually granted, patents 
applied for in 2005 and 2006 may not yet exist in the database; for this reason, 
following the approach of Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we end our analysis in 2004.  
As outlined in Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1987), the patent count 
approximates innovation success in an imperfect manner because patents differ 
substantially in their importance. Hence, the patent citations better capture the 
technological and economic significance of patents (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg, 2005). However, our patent citations variable suffers from problems 
of truncation, since for patents granted in years closer to the final year of the NBER 
database, less time is available to obtain citations. To address this issue, we follow 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, (2005) who adjust the patent citations multiplying the 
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citations count by the weighting
13
 index, also available in the NBER database. Hence, 
our database is the intersection between the Edgar database, Compustat, Execucomp, 
CRSP data and the NBER patent, and consists of 1,205 listed firms from 1995 to 
2004, with 4,976 firm-year observations.  
This paper expands the existing literature since it is the first paper analysing 
the relationship between corporate culture and firms’ innovation process. We show 
that a creative corporate culture is positively associated with R&D investment and 
innovative output. We also show a positive relation between a creativity-oriented 
corporate culture and firm value. These results are in line with the findings of Guiso 
et al. (2013), who show that innovation is the most advertised value on listed 
company webpages dedicated to corporate culture. We show that listed firms tend to 
advertise their innovative corporate culture, since it is, on average, positively related 
to firm value.  
The paper proceeds as follows: we describe our measures for corporate culture 
in section two; section three describes our sample; in section four, we examine the 
relation between corporate culture and innovative activities; section five analyses the 
association between corporate culture and firm value; in section six, we present an 
instrumental variable approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns about our cultural 
variables; finally, we formulate our conclusions in Section seven. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
 
Corporate culture is a general concept that comprises "a set of norms and values that 
are widely shared and strongly held throughout the organization" (O'Reilly and 
                                                        
13 Specifically we multiply the citations count (the variable allcites in the NBER database) with the 
weighting index (the variable hjtwt in the NBER database) to account for the truncation. The weighting 
index is constructed to account for patent obsolescence and for the 2006 truncation. 
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Chatman, 1996). Consistent with Deal and Kennedy (1982), Peters and Waterman, 
(1982), Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) and Schein (1992), the definition of O'Reilly and 
Chatman (1996) outlines that corporate culture can influence economic outcomes, 
such as an organization’s effectiveness and value creation. As we focus in this paper 
on the role of corporate culture in affecting firms’ innovation ability, we need to 
define culture dimensions in a precise way. To this purpose, we follow Cameron et al. 
(2006), and we use the competing value framework (CVF) that defines four culture 
dimensions: control, competition, collaboration, and creation.  
The CVF framework draws on Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983)'s, which is a 
framework widely used in the literature (Hartnell et al., 2011; Ostroff et al., 2003; 
Schneider et al., 2013). The CVF defines corporate culture as internally or externally 
oriented. An internally oriented firm can have a collaboration-oriented culture (termed 
“clan culture type” in the CVF), which has an employee focus aiming at developing 
competencies and strengthening organizational culture. The intuition is that this 
affiliation engenders positive employee attitudes. This culture aims to develop 
cooperation and the participation of employees in corporate decisions, i.e. it clarifies 
and reinforces organizational values, norms, and expectations, developing employees 
and cross-functional work groups, implementing programmes to enhance employee 
retention. Companies promoting this culture can be successful, since they succeed in 
retaining their human resource. An internally oriented culture can also be control-
oriented (also called “hierarchy culture”). This corporate culture is structured on clear 
and rigid mechanisms. The goal of a control-oriented firm is to create value 
improving efficiency, enhancing the effectiveness of internal processes (e.g., 
improving systems, and technology). Companies with this culture usually have 
standardized procedures and are focused on rule reinforcement and uniformity. 
94 
The CVF also outlines two externally oriented corporate cultures. The first is 
the competition-oriented culture (named “market culture type”). Firms with this 
culture focus on external effectiveness, by aiming to enhance competitiveness and 
accentuating the importance of fast response and customer focus. Customer and 
shareholder judgment is fundamental for competition-oriented firms. The other 
culture type is the creativity-oriented culture (termed “adhocracy” in the CVF), which 
focuses on innovation in products and services. The firm encourages employees to 
share ideas, to have vision, and constantly change, e.g., allowing for freedom of 
thought and action among employees, such that rule breaking and reaching beyond 
barriers are common characteristics of the organisation's culture. These companies 
usually encourage radical new process breakthroughs and innovations, and develop 
new technologies that redefine entire industries. 
 
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >> 
 
In this paper, we test the intuitive belief that a creativity-oriented corporate culture 
does indeed improve firms’ ability to innovate. Specifically, we posit that creativity-
oriented corporations are able to obtain valuable output from their investment in 
research and development. 
H1: A creativity-oriented corporate culture is positively associated with the 
investment in R&D firms patenting activity and with firm value. 
Hypothesis H1 implicitly suggests that firms with a creativity-oriented 
corporate culture are able to translate their investment in R&D into firm value.  
The effects of the other three corporate cultures that are part of the competing 
value framework with respect to firms’ innovation activity are more ambiguous. 
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Innovation projects are risky and are associated with uncertain outcomes (Manso, 
2011). Therefore, firms with a corporate culture more orientated to competition may 
incur lower R&D expenses, as they may not increase performance in the short-run. 
However, firms with a competition-oriented corporate culture may still invest in R&D 
in order to differentiate their products and “escape competition” (Aghion et al., 2005). 
Similarly, a collaboration-oriented corporate culture can be particularly successful in 
retaining competences and human capital, an aspect that can have a positive effect on 
a firm’s innovation activity. On the other hand, the commitment to the internal 
functioning and a high level of satisfaction can lead collaboration-oriented firms to 
refrain from initiating innovative projects, and to remain loyal to the current products 
and the internal structures. In a similar fashion, control-oriented corporate cultures 
committed to the smooth functioning of internal process, can increase the innovation 
activity in order to improve cost efficiency. Also, firms with a control-oriented 
corporate culture may dislike the uncertainty embedded in innovative projects, which 
restrains their investments in innovation. Therefore, we refrain from formulating 
explicit hypotheses with regard to the link between innovation ability and corporate 
cultures with a competition-, control-, and collaboration-orientation. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive statistics 
 
We construct our sample by combining data obtained from five different databases: 
(1) accounting variables from Compustat, (2) market information from CRSP, (3) 10-
Ks used to calculate the corporate culture proxies from the SEC Edgar Database, (4) 
executives’ characteristics from Execucomp, and (5) patent information from the 
NBER database. Hence, the sample combines Compustat, CRSP, Edgar Execucomp, 
and the NBER patent databases. Financial firms (i.e. firms with four digit SIC code 
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from 6000 to 6999) are excluded from the analysis. The resulting sample consists of 
1,205 firms over a time window spanning from 1995 to 2004, and engendering a total 
of 4,976 firm-year observations. A description of all the variables is reported in Table 
1, and the summary statistics are reported in Table 2.  
 
<< INSERT TABLE 1 AND 2>> 
 
 Table 2 reports that the average investment in R&D represents 4.32% of 
firms’ assets, while the average Tobin’s Q is 2.28 with a standard deviation of 1.62. 
Table 2 also reports how a competition-oriented culture is the most frequently 
adopted by listed firms: on average, words capturing a competition orientation 
represent 3.58% of the words used in firms’ 10 s, whereas words reflecting a control-
oriented corporate culture represent on average 2.04%. Words related, respectively, to 
collaboration and creation-oriented cultures represent on average 1.01%, and 0.70% 
of the total number of words in the 10Ks. 
 
3.1 Measuring Corporate Culture  
To quantitatively measure the four dimensions of corporate culture in the spirit of 
Cameron et al. (2006), we use text analysis. Text analysis is a method used to 
systematically analyse the characteristics and the content of a specific text (Stone et 
al., 1966). To measure corporate culture, we assume that the words and the language 
used by the members of a listed firm (named “vocabulary”) reveal some information 
on the culture they develop over time (Levinson, 2003). 
We argue that the features of any firm are reflected in its official written 
documents and that our text analysis is able to structurally examine the content of 
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firms' official documents (namely, 10-K reports). The extant finance and management 
literature makes widely use of text analysis (e.g., Antweiler and Murray, 2004; 
Hoberg and Hanley, 2010; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; Li, 2008; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008). To estimate our culture 
dimensions, which we define in Figure 1  (collaboration, competition, control, and 
creation) we identify a large set of words for each cultural dimension. Each set of 
words is selected by means of a two-steps process. First, we select the synonyms 
suggested by Cameron et al. (2006) to identify each cultural dimension. Second, all 
words selected during the first step are identified in the Harvard-IV Dictionary for 
additional synonyms. Loughran and McDonald (2011) point out that the use of the 
Harvard dictionary in text analysis significantly decreases the impact of a researcher’s 
subjectivity in terms of word selection. As an example, words like “cooperation” are 
associated with the word “collaborate” in the Harvard Dictionary, and a relatively 
high frequency of their use in corporate documents suggests that the company has a 
collaboration-oriented culture. Words such as “performance” or “achieve” are 
associated with a competition-oriented corporate culture. Words such as “dream, 
begin, elaborate” are more associated with “create”, and a relatively high frequency 
of their use in corporate documents suggests that the company has a creativity-
oriented culture. Words such as “boss, efficiency, caution” are considered synonyms 
for “control” and point toward a control-oriented culture. We calculate the 
prominence and the frequency with which our synonyms are reported in each annual 
10-K and we use the resulting percentage to approximate cultural orientation. For 
instance, the “competition-oriented” variable equals to 5 if the synonyms 
approximating this culture dimension represent 5% of all words in the entire 
document. The correlation between our variables is reported in Table 3. 
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<< INSERT TABLE 3>> 
  
3.2 Other Variables 
 
We argue that firms’ innovation ability is affected by their corporate cultures. To test 
this broad hypothesis, following Aghion et al. (2013), we also control for: firm size 
(the natural logarithm of total sales), capital intensity (the net property, plant and 
equipment related to the number of employees), and firm age (the current fiscal year 
minus the first year when the firm appears in Compustat). Moreover, since higher 
innovative output is likely to be associated with larger stock returns, we also control 
for the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. Galasso et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer 
et al. (2012) show that innovation activity increases with managerial overconfidence, 
which is why we include a proxy for CEO overconfidence based on the option-based 
criterion of Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008). Here, the idea is that it is optimal for 
risk-averse, undiversified executives to exercise their own firm’s stock options early 
if the option is sufficiently in the money (Hall and Murphy 2002). Our control 
variable Longholder takes the value 1 if the CEO postpones the exercise of options 
that are at least 67% in the money (the standard criterion also used by Malmendier 
and Tate 2005, 2008; Cambell et al., 2011; Galasso et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 
2012).
14
 Aghion et al. (2013) outline that institutional ownership is an important 
determinant of firm innovation activity; for this reason, we also include institutional 
ownership as a control variable. 
                                                        
14 More specifically, for each CEO, we divide his total realizable value of the exercisable options by 
the total number of options he holds. The average strike price of the option is deduced by subtracting 
the average realizable value from the stock price at the end of the fiscal year. The average moneyness 
of the option is then obtained by dividing the stock price at the end of the fiscal year by the average 
strike price, and subtracting one. If the moneyness of the stock option is above 67%, we rank the 
executive k in that year t as a longholder. 
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4. Corporate culture, the investment in innovation, and the patenting 
activity of firms 
 
Our broad hypothesis is that a creative corporate culture is positively associated with 
a firm’s propensity to undertake innovative projects. Specifically, we expect that a 
creation-oriented corporate culture is positively associated with a firm’s innovation 
activities. In the first step of our analysis, we test if R&D investment and firms’ 
patenting activity are positively associated with a creative corporate culture. 
Model (1) of Table 4 reports the results of a relation between R&D investment 
and corporate culture alone. We progressively include in Models (4) to (8) firm 
dimension, capital intensity, market-based firm performance, firm age, a measure of 
CEO’s confidence (Longholder) and the share of the firm controlled by institutional 
investors. For an easier interpretation of the coefficients, we standardize all the 
independent variables centring them on their mean and dividing each variable by its 
standard deviation. We find consistent results that a corporate culture fostering 
creativity is positively associated with the firms’ innovation activity. In this type of 
culture, employees are stimulated to be creative and take risks. They are expected to 
thrive in a change-oriented environment. We also control for a firm’s scores on other 
dimensions of corporate culture. For instance, we find that R&D intensity goes hand 
in hand with a control-oriented environment (Control), which focuses on efficiency 
and rule-driven processes. R&D intensity is weaker in firms concentrating on market 
share and productivity (Compete).  More specifically, Model (1) shows that one 
standard deviation in our variable create is related to an increase of 0.18 (p<0.1) in 
R&D investment; this increase represents 4.35% of the average R&D intensity in our 
sample. This result is unaffected if we add control variables to the regression model. 
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Specifically, Model (4) shows that a standard deviation increase in our variable create 
is associated with an increase in the investment in research and development of 0.21 
(p<0.05); this represents 4.96% of the average investment in R&D in our sample. 
Model (2) and Model (3) also report the association between our variable 
create and firms’ patenting activity. In Model (2) and in model (3), the dependent 
variable is respectively the natural logarithm of one plus the patent count, and one 
plus the citations received by the patents weighted using the variable “hjtwt” in the 
NBER dataset in order to account for truncation (the fact that recently granted patents 
have had a more limited time to get citations). Model (2) and (3) confirm our earlier 
findings: a corporate culture stimulating creativity leads to higher innovative output as 
captured by patent count and patent citations. When the Creativity score augments by 
one standard deviation, the patent count goes up by 3.95% (p<0.05) while patent 
citations by 7.13% (p<0.10). Models (5) and (6) also confirm that patent count and 
patent quality continue to be correlated with a creative corporate culture if we 
augment our regression model with additional control variables at firm level.  
Furthermore, in Models (5) and (6) we also add R&D expenses on total assets to the 
analysis. As outlined in Aghion et al. (2013) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012), to test for a 
higher ability to innovate, we need to control for the R&D stock when analysing R&D 
productivity, i.e. the ability of firms to obtain higher innovative output from R&D 
investment. Therefore, Models (5) and (6) report the association between our variable 
create and the firm’s patenting activity controlling for investment in R&D. Our results 
indicate that firms with a creativity-oriented corporate culture also have higher 
innovation productivity, meaning that they produce higher innovative output 
following investment in R&D. A standard deviation increase in our variable create is 
associated with a 4.60% increase in the patent count and to a 7.90% increase in the 
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quality of the patents represented by the patent citations. The reported results also 
confirm H1 outlining how a creativity-oriented corporate culture is associated with an 
increase in patent quality, even after controlling for investment in R&D. The last two 
models in Table 4 also report results using industry fixed effects instead of firm fixed 
effects (Models (7) and (8)), and focus on the differences between firms within the 
same industry. The reported results show that the estimated coefficients are larger 
than those estimated using firm fixed effects outlining some persistency in our 
cultural variables. In conclusion, our results indicate that a creative-oriented corporate 
culture is associated with higher innovation output. Therefore, it is possible that firms 
with a higher score in our variable create are more able to translate R&D investment 
in firm value.  
  
<< INSERT TABLE 4>> 
 
5. Corporate culture, the investment in innovation and firm value 
In this section, we turn our focus to firm value as expressed by Tobin’s Q. We posit 
that firms with a creation-oriented corporate culture are more able to create value 
from their investment in R&D. To test this broad hypothesis, we regress Tobin’s Q on 
R&D investment and our culture variables plus some controls. In the regressions 
reported in Table 5 variables are standardized and winsorized at 1% level and all the 
regressions are run using time dummies and, as indicated, industry or firm fixed 
effects. Standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at industry level. 
In Model (1), we regress firm value on the variable create alone, and we show 
that a one standard deviation increase in our variable create is related with an increase 
in firm value of 10.03% (p<0.05), that represents the 4.39% of the average Tobin’s Q 
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in our sample. This evidence suggests that corporate culture relates to firm value 
through innovation. A possible explanation of this result, which is consistent with H1, 
is that corporate culture increases firms’ ability to innovate. Therefore, in Models (2), 
(3) and (4) we also add R&D expenses on total assets to the analysis. As expected, the 
R&D investment is positively associated with firm value. However, most importantly, 
Models (2) and (3) show that our previous result on creation-oriented corporate 
culture is not affected if we add the R&D expenses to the regression on firm value. 
Specifically, Model (2) shows that the positive association between our variable 
create and firm value is still statistically significant (p<0.10) if we add R&D expenses 
as additional control variables to the analysis and if we use firm fixed effects. Model 
(3) shows how a one standard deviation increase in our variable create, is associated 
with an increase in firm value of 6.23% (p<0.10), which represents 2.73% of the 
average firm value in our sample even after controlling for some firm, executives and 
shareholders characteristics. Thus, these results confirm H1 according to which a 
creative corporate culture is positively associated with firm value. This positive 
association may flow through investment in innovation. However, the decision to 
invest in innovation can also be affected by unobservable firms characteristics. These 
unknown characteristics may in turn correlate with both firm value and firms’ 
patenting activity, thus, generating a bias in the coefficients reported so far.  
Moreover, it also possible that creation-oriented corporate culture increases just 
before the innovation output only because firms advertise their innovation activity in 
their 10-K, potentially generating a reverse causality issue. In the next session, we 
rely on exogenous shocks to firms’ investment in R&D to alleviate both these 
concerns. 
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<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
 
6. Instrumenting create with the changes in R&D tax-credit  
In this section, we use State-level R&D tax credit as instrument for our variable 
create. State-level R&D tax credits vary substantially over time and state. The 
variation over States can be significant; there are States that have never introduced 
any tax credit on R&D as Kentucky, South Dakota or Tennessee and States such as 
Arizona that introduced a tax credit of 20% for R&D expenditure in 1993. State level 
tax incentives for R&D can also vary substantially across time within the same State; 
for instance, California introduced a tax credit of 8% in 1987 that increased to 11% in 
1997 and 15% in 2000. The data on tax credit comes from Wilson (2009)
15
 that shows 
how state level tax incentives for R&D increase firms’ investment in R&D. Bloom et 
al.(2013) also use these tax credits as instruments for firm investment in R&D. The 
authors show how tax incentives increase firms’ investment in innovation without 
being correlated with firms’ characteristics. Specifically, Bloom et al. (2013) outline 
that tax incentives for R&D are uncorrelated with economic or political variables. 
Hence, tax credit incentives for investment in R&D provide pseudo-random variation 
to investment in R&D. Since we show that the positive association between creative 
oriented corporate culture and firm value passes by the investment in R&D, we use 
tax incentives for R&D to instrument our variable create. Our identification 
assumption is that tax-credit incentives affect a firm’s propensity to undertake 
innovative projects (i.e. their cultural orientation) without correlating to firm’s 
characteristics. Hence, in a first step, we predict the creation-oriented corporate 
culture using state dummies and the state level incentives for R&D provided by 
                                                        
15 The entire database of State-level R&D tax credit can be found on the Wilson website at the 
following link: http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/economists/daniel-wilson/  
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Wilson (2009). The firms’ patenting activity and firms’ value is then regressed on the 
predicted value of our variable create using time dummies and industry fixed effects 
plus some control variables. Results are reported in Table 6. Model (1) in Table 6 
reports the coefficients estimated using the two stage least squares approach described 
above. Results show how the coefficients of Create in the two-step regression are 
significant (p<0.01) and larger than in previous models. Specifically, the results 
reported in Table 6 show that a standard deviation increase in our variable create 
increase the firm patenting activity by 54.27%. The results reported in Table 6 also 
show how a standard deviation increase in our variable create increases firm value by 
42.67%, representing the 18.68% of our sample average. Therefore, the results from 
the two-stage model confirm our research hypothesis that a creativity-oriented 
corporate culture is positively associated with firms’ patenting activity and with firm 
value.  




The majority of firms listed in S&P 500 mention that their innovative capacity largely 
hinges on their corporate culture. In spite of this, academic literature has ignored the 
role of corporate culture in the innovation process. This paper provides a first step on 
this issue. We show that firms that are more oriented to creation invest more in 
innovation. We also show that this higher investment is associated with higher 
success in innovation activity. Moreover, we show that a higher success in innovation 
is positively associated with higher firm value as expressed by Tobin’s Q.  
This result outlines that innovation process is associated with firms’ corporate 
culture. This positive association with firms’ value also explains why firms are 
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strongly focused on advertising innovation among their corporate values.  
The reported results complement the findings of Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014), 
according to which a creativity-oriented corporate culture increases the probability of 
CEO turnover. Since the findings of this paper show that creativity-oriented 
companies are more involved in risky innovative projects, it seems plausible to 
conclude that executives working in companies with such culture orientation are more 
likely to be fired. This is consistent with recent literature (Aghion et al. 2013) 
outlining that executives with carrier concerns a là Holmstom (1982) may restrain 
from innovative projects, as innovation can increase the probability of being fired. 
This evidence is also consistent with existing literature (Galasso et al., 2011, and 
Hirshleifer et al., 2012), which indicates that overconfident executives 
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Means: Cohesion, participation, 
communication  




Means: Adaptability, agility, 
flexibility 





Thrust: Control  
Means: Capable process, 
consistency, measurement  





Thrust: Compete  
Means: Customer focus, productivity, 
enhancing competitiveness 
Ends: Market share, profitability, goal 
achievement  
 
Stability and Control 
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Achievement People behave 
appropriately 


































(Hierarchy) when they have 
clear roles, and 
procedures are 
formally defined 







Competing Value Framework (CVD) 
Panel C: 
Culture Type Bag of words 
Control 
 
administrat*, analys*, boss*, burocr*, cautio*, cheap*, chief*, conservat*, 
consisten*, control*, cost*, cut*, disciplin*, document*, effectiv*, efficien*, 
enhance*, improv*, logic*, measur*, method*, organize*, outcom*, 
predictab*, procedur*, process*, productiv*, qualit*, regular*, rule*, 
standard*, system*, technical*, uniform* 
Compete 
 
achiev*, acquir*, acquis*, aggress*, analyst*, attack*, client*, challeng*, 
compet*, customer*, edge*, excellen*, expand*, expans*, fast*, growth*, 
market*, perform*, position*, pressur*, profit*, rapid*, result*, revenue*, 
share*, short-term*, speed*, superior*, value*, win* 
Collaborate 
 
balan*, capab*, cohes*, collab*, collectiv*, commit*, commun*, competen*, 
consens*, contribut*, cooperat*, coordin*, decentr*, dialogue*, employ*, 
empower*, engag*, facilitator*, help*, hir*, human*, interper*, involv*, long-
last*, long-term*, loyal*, mentor*, mutual*, people*, relation*, responsib*, 
retain*, reten*, reward*, skill*, social*, solidif*, team*, teamwork*, train*, 
willingness*, work group* 
Create 
 
adapt*, chang*, creat*, discontin*, dream*, dynamic*, emerg*, entrepre*, 
envis*, experim*, fantas*, freedom*, futuri*, idea*, imagin*, inventive*, 
new*, niche*, origin*, pioneer* uncertain*, unpredictable*, ventur*, vision*, 
unafra* 
  




This table reports the variable description and data sources.  
    Dependent Variables Description                 Database 
            
            
 
The ratio of the expenses for research and 
development in terms of total assets (in %) 
Compustat 
            
 
Total assets minus shareholder equity plus 
market capitalization divided by total assets 
 
Compustat/CRSP 
             
The natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of patents applied for during the year 
NBER 
   
             
The natural logarithm of one plus the 
weighted number of citations received by all 




Cultural Variables Description        Database        
          
The relative frequency of words in the 10-K 




               
The relative frequency of words in the 10-K 




           
The relative frequency of words in the 10-K 




           
The relative frequency of words in the 10-K 




Control Variables Description        Database        
             
Natural logarithm of total sales 
 
Compustat 
   
            
 




          
The buy and hold return over the fiscal year 
 
CRSP 
            
Current fiscal year minus first year the firm 




              
T 
his dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO does 
not exercise his stock options with a 
moneyness higher than 67% 
 
Execucomp 
               
             




   
  




This Table reports the summary statistics of all variables. 
Dependent Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
            
               
 
4,976 4.3194 6.1087 
            3,957 2.2835 1.6243 
             4,976 1.4499 1.6872 
             4,976 2.3504 2.7610 
Cultural Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
          4,976 0.6985 0.2445 
               4,976 1.0076 0.2916 
           4,976 3.5801 1.0459 
           4,976 2.0414 0.6414 
Control Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
             4,976 7.0266 1.5828 
   
            
 
4,976 3.8912 1.0862 
          4,976 1.1245 0.5686 
            4,976 20.5472 12.2498 
              4,976 0.4650 0.4988 
              





Correlation between corporate culture scores. 
This table reports the Pearson correlations between our corporate culture measures 
and their statistical significance. The corporate culture variables are estimated using 
text analysis on the firms’10-Ks. 
                                                             
          1 
   

























This table relates the expenses for research and development (R&D) on total assets (%), the number of patents applied for by 
each firm and the patent citations received by the patents owned by each firm (the dependent variables) to our cultural variables 
Collaborate, Compete, Control, and Create. The latter are constructed by means of text analysis from the firms’ 10-Ks. All 
variables are winsorized at 1% level, centred on their mean and divided by their standard deviation. The regressions include time 
fixed effects and, where indicated firm or industry fixed effects, the standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at 
industry level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
            
            
                     
            
            
                                         
              
            
            
 
    0.00096 0.12446*** 0.33050*** 0.53002*** 
     (0.02528) (0.04371) (0.07199) (0.09449) 
            0.18773* 0.03953** 0.07139* 0.21412** 0.04609** 0.07908* 0.12308*** 0.14495** 
 
(0.11047) (0.01829) (0.04258) (0.09797) (0.02101) (0.04178) (0.03843) (0.05736) 
                
   
-0.02915 0.01404 -0.02872 0.05980 0.03051 
    
(0.05508) (0.02653) (0.05904) (0.03586) (0.05782) 
            
   
-0.24379*** -0.02683 -0.10423** -0.05193 -0.07575 
    
(0.08154) (0.01945) (0.04982) (0.03589) (0.06111) 
             
   
0.28175*** 0.02490 0.17514*** 0.05415 0.14050** 
    
(0.10361) (0.02436) (0.05817) (0.03544) (0.07060) 
               
   
-0.36443 0.28690*** 0.59020*** 0.95965*** 1.26101*** 
    
(0.36674) (0.08339) (0.14032) (0.05672) (0.08089) 
   
              
 
   
-0.14426 0.15180** 0.24520* 0.34101*** 0.46540*** 
    
(0.24441) (0.07531) (0.14341) (0.11162) (0.14206) 
            
   
-0.18775*** 0.00062 0.02942** 0.04245*** 0.07664*** 
    
(0.04692) (0.00699) (0.01403) (0.00969) (0.02096) 
             
   
0.15144** 0.04495* 0.05167 0.00534 0.00781 
    
(0.07192) (0.02669) (0.04263) (0.00358) (0.00559) 
               
   
-0.13594* 0.07039** 0.19696*** 0.11099** 0.23030*** 
    
(0.07757) (0.02859) (0.05217) (0.04486) (0.07955) 
              
                  -0.11174 0.00761 -0.00809 0.04627 0.08942 
    (0.15353) (0.03714) (0.07868) (0.03701) (0.07585) 
         4.62157*** 1.57543*** 3.14159*** 2.13582* 0.92594** 2.37149*** 1.63464*** 3.15208*** 
 
(0.13556) (0.04474) (0.08802) (1.23000) (0.43223) (0.69068) (0.09559) (0.14986) 
    
    
                   Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
                   Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
                       N N N N N N Y Y 
             4,976 4,976 4,976 4,976 4,976 4,976 4,976 4,976 
 









This table shows the results of the relation between the dependent variable Tobin’s Q, and corporate culture, 
as measured by Collaborate, Compete, Control and Create which are constructed using textual analysis from 
the companies’10-Ks. All variables are winsorized at 1% level, centred on their mean and divided by their 
standard deviation. We control in each model for time fixed effects and as specified by firm or industry 
fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at industry level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
                                    
                
            
 
 
0.34811** 0.31623*** 0.34256*** 
  
(0.13627) (0.10533) (0.11272) 
           0.10030** 0.09027* 0.06227* 0.02792 
 
(0.04562) (0.04567) (0.03610) (0.05926) 
                 
  
-0.10153* -0.07550 
   
(0.05295) (0.04552) 
             
  
-0.00936 -0.05618 
   
(0.02455) (0.04354) 
            
  
0.14791*** 0.00788 
   
(0.05411) (0.04326) 
               
  
-0.97130*** 0.05863 
   
(0.22323) (0.03920) 
   




   
(0.16054) (0.10470) 
           
  
0.11038*** 0.12796*** 
   
(0.02767) (0.03205) 
             
  
-0.00313 -0.00645 
   
(0.01046) (0.00575) 
               
  
0.30525*** 0.63304*** 
   
(0.04015) (0.08636) 
              
               
  
-0.06150 0.08437 
   
(0.06584) (0.05417) 
        2.30126*** 2.16444*** 1.82426*** 1.89466*** 
 
(0.06936) (0.10324) (0.16953) (0.17522) 
                  Y Y Y Y 
                   Y Y Y N 
                       N N N Y 
             3,957 3,957 3,957 3,957 
 












Instrumenting creative corporate culture with tax credit on R&D 
This table relates the number of patents applied for by each firm, the patent 
citations received by the patents owned by each firm and firm value (Tobin’s Q) 
(the dependent variables) to our cultural variable Create. The latter is constructed 
by means of text analysis from the firms’ 10-Ks. In the models reported below the 
cultural variable create is instrumented with the changes in the tax credits for R&D 
at a state level as reported in Wilson (2009). The first stage F-statistic is also 
reported. All variables are winsorized at 1% level centred on their means and 
divided by their standard deviation. The regressions include time fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects; the standard errors (reported in parentheses) are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for first order autocorrelation. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
                              
            0.54278*** 0.71287*** 0.42671*** 
 (0.11505) (0.18167) (0.11576) 
               0.81044*** 1.05097*** -0.12194*** 
 
(0.03240) (0.04938) (0.03952) 
   
              
 
0.22834*** 0.31506*** 0.11188** 
 
(0.04487) (0.07211) (0.04971) 
            0.00445* 0.00512 -0.00588** 
 
(0.00232) (0.00361) (0.00246) 
              0.03590** 0.07126** 0.13255*** 
 
(0.01690) (0.02880) (0.03122) 
                0.11448*** 0.23069*** 0.76789*** 
 (0.04322) (0.06981) (0.05327) 
               
               0.06330** 0.11504*** 0.10090*** 
 (0.02535) (0.04059) (0.03293) 
         1.11763*** 0.35178 0.57262*** 
 
(0.37315) (0.54333) (0.12612) 
                   Y Y Y 
                       Y Y Y 
             4,942 4,942 3,923 
First stage  
F-statistic 7.194 7.194 7.203 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
